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ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the presiding judge of the Third Judicial 
District err by disqualifying Judge Rigtrup after a trial on 
the merits. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant prays this Court to vacate the order of 
the trial court by which Judge Rigtrup was disqualified, and 
to remand the case to Judge Rigtrup for further proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Madsen entered into a home loan with Prudential. 
The trust deed contract required Madsen to pay funds into an 
escrow account. Madsen claimed that he was entitled to 
interest or earnings on the escrowed funds. The case was 
brought as a class action. 
The case is nearly twelve years old. After 
exhaustive litigation, including two appellate decisions, 
the case was finally tried on the merits before the Honor-
able Kenneth Rigtrup. 
Madsen v. Prudential Savings & Loan, 558 P.2d 
1337 (Utah 1977); Madsen v. Prudential Savings & Loan, 635 
F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980). 
Near the end of the trial (but prior to any 
ruling), Judge Rigtrup remarked that he had once financed a 
home through Prudential. (Exhibit A at p. 4 94.) Judge 
Rigtrup reminded counsel that he had disclosed that rela-
tionship early in the case. (Exhibit A at p.495.) 
Prudential's attorney replied that he could not 
recall the earlier disclosures. (Exhibit A at pp.494-497.) 
Nevertheless, Prudential did not object to Judge Rigtrup 
continuing on the case. Nor did Prudential seek a continu-
ance. 
Therefore, Judge Rigtrup proceeded with the trial 
and made a bench ruling against Prudential in the sum of 
2 $134.70 (Exhibit A at p.507.) Prudential waited 
thirty-nine days after the ruling before filing a motion to 
disqualify Judge Rigtrup. (R. 99.) Prudential further 
moved to void all of Judge Rigtrup's prior rulings. 
The disqualification motion was heard by Judge 
Fishier (presiding judge). Judge Fishier granted the motion 
and vacated all prior rulings of Judge Rigtrup including the 
trial. (Exhibits B and C.) 
This verdict involves only the named plaintiff 
Richard Madsen. Further, proceedings on the class aspects 
of the case were reserved. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The sole basis for disqualification in this case 
was an "appearance of bias". In fact the trial court made a 
specific finding that there was no actual bias. However 
there is no statutory authority to disqualify a judge 
without a specific finding of actual bias. 
An "appearance of bias" might constitute a viola-
tion of the Code of Judicial Conducte However, if a judge 
violates the Code, the judge should be penalized. Here the 
plaintiff was penalized, and no action was taken against the 
judgee 
At most, Judge Rigtrup had a remote, contingent, 
and speculative interest of about $134 in this case. A 
recent decision of the U.S. Supreme Court has squarely ruled 
that judges need not be disqualified for such speculative 
trivia. 
Finally, Prudential failed to make a timely 
objection to Judge Rigtrup. Rather, the judge's decision 
was announced, over a month before Prudential got around to 
objecting. Thus, any error was waived. 
POINT I 
JUDGE RIGTRUP'S INTEREST IN THIS CASE 
IS REMOTE, SPECULATIVE, AND TRIVIAL 
A. Judge Rigtrup is Not a Member of the Existing Class. 
This case was certified as a class action years 
ago by Judge Croft. (See Exhibit D.) It is important to 
emphasize that Judge Rigtrup is not a member of that 
existing class. Indeed, the trial court has made a specific 
3 
finding that Judge Rigtrup is not a party in this case. 
(Ex. C.) 
It is true that Judge Rigtrup did have a home loan 
with Prudential. However, discovery has shown that 
Prudential uses several different contract forms. (R. 15 to 
38.) Judge Rigtrup1s contract was completely different. 
(Exhibit E.) Thusf Judge Rigtrup is not a member of the 
3 
existing class. 
Since Judge Rigtrup is not a member of the exist-
ing class, he has no direct interest in this case. 
B. Judge Rigtrup Has Ruled That He Will Not Be a Part of 
Any Future Enlarged Class. 
After the class was originally certified, Madsen 
amended the complaint (R. 59 to 86.) The amended complaint 
added new theories and sought to enlarge the class. 
The Trust Deed For The The Rigtrup Trust Deed 
Certified Class (ExhibTt D) (Exhibit E) 
[T]he trustor agrees to pay to 
the beneficiary, upon the same 
day each month, budget payments 
estimated to equal one-twelfth 
of the annual taxes and insur-
ance premiums . . . and said 
budget payments are hereby 
pledged to the beneficiary as 
additional security for the 
full performance of this deed 
of trust and the note secured 
thereby. The budget payments 
so accumulated may be withdrawn 
by the beneficiary for the pay-
ment of taxes or insurance 
premiums due on the premises. 
. . . [T]he Mortgagor will pay 
to the mortgagee, on the first 
day of each month . . . the 
premiums that will next become 
due and payable on policies of 
fire and other hazard insur-
ance covering the mortgaged 
property, plus taxes and 
assessments next due on the 
mortgaged property . . . such 
sums to be held by mortgagee 
in trust to pay the ground 
rents, premiums, taxes and 
assessments before the same 
become delinquent. 
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Under the amended complaint all customers of Prudential 
would have become class members. Obviously, Judge Rigtrup 
would have been a member of that enlarged class. 
However, the amended complaint only set forth a 
potential class. The class would have no existence unless 
certified. Rule 23(c)(1) U.R.CoP. states; 
As soon as practicable after the com-
mencement of an action brought as a 
class action, the court shall determine 
by order whether it is to be maintained. 
Plaintiff did make a motion to certify the new 
class. (R. 87.) If the new class had been certified, Judge 
Rigtrup would have become a member of that new class. 
However, Judge Rigtrup denied the motion to certify the new 
4 
class. (R. 90.) 
In summary, Judge Rigtrup was a potential class 
member, but he squarely ruled that the enlarged potential 
class would not come into existence. 
4 
The motion is sometimes referred to as a motion 
to add a defendant class. However, in substance the motion 
sought to add a defendant class, and to substantially 
enlarge the plaintiff class. The new enlarged plaintiff 
class would (if certified) have included Judge Rigtrup. 
It is difficult to see how there could be an 
"appearance of bias* in this case when Judge Rigtrup ruled 
against his own interest in this matter-
5 
C. Judge Rigtrup Can Never Bring an Individual Claim. 
We have demonstrated in paragraph A and B, above, 
that Judge Rigtrup was not a member of any existing or 
potential class of plaintiffs in this case. Indeed, the 
sole basis for disqualification was that a new individual 
lawsuit might be brought in the future, and that Judge 
Rigtrup might benefit from that future lawsuit. Specifical-
ly, the lower Court stated: 
[I]t is conceivable that his 
[Judge Rigtrup] rulings could be binding 
upon Prudential in other similar litiga-
tion in which Judge Rigtrup could be a 
plaintiff on a theory of collateral 
estoppel. 
(Exhibit B at P.3 and 4.) 
In theory, Judge Rigtrup might have filed his own 
individual lawsuit against Prudential. However, any inde-
pendent claim which Judge Rigtrup might have had is squarely 
barred by the statute of limitations. §7-17-9(2) Utah Code 
7 Annotated. 
In short, Judge Rigtrup has no present interest in 
this case; no future interest in this case; and not even any 
theoretical interest in this case. 
The Rigtrup mortgage was paid off in December of 
1983 which was apparently before Judge Rigtrup was ever 
assigned to sit on this case. (R. 203.) 
7 
"No action seeking payment of interest on or 
other compensation for use of the funds in any reserve 
account for any period prior to July 1, 1979 shall be 
brought after June 30, 1981". 
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POINT II 
THE DISQUALIFICATION WAS BASED SOLELY ON AN 
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
The grounds for disqualifying a judge are found in 
Article VIII, §13 of the Utah Constitution, (Exhibit F) 
§78-7-1 of the Utah Code Ann. , (Exhibit G) and Rule 63 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, (Exhibit H.) 
Rule 63, U.R.C.P. states that "Whenever a party «, 
. . shall make and file an affidavit that the Judge . . . 
has a bias or prejudice . . • such judge shall proceed no 
further therein . . .fl (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it 
has always been the law in Utah that a disqualification must 
be based upon an actual bias. See Haslam v. Morrison, 113 
Ut.14, 190 P.520 (1948). 
However, the trial court made a specific finding 
that there was no actual bias: 
[A] 11 prior rulings of Judge 
Rigtrup be and the same are hereby set 
aside on the ground and for the reason 
that although there is no actual bias on 
the part of Judge Rigtrup, there is an 
appearance of bias* (Exhibit C.) 
Rather, the trial court based disqualification 
squarely on an "appearance of bias" under the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. The trial court stated: 
More importantly, in 1974 the Utah 
Supreme Court approved the Code of 
Judicial Conduct. Canon 3(c) provides 
that a judge shall disqualify himself in 
a proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned. This 
court concludes that the impartiality of 
Judge Rigtrup might be reasonably 
questioned, and therefore Judge Rigtrup 
should have disqualified himself . . . 
(Ex.B at p.3.) 
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POINT III 
THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF THE 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Madsen does not concede that the Code of Judicial 
Conduct is applicable in this case. (See Point IV below.) 
However, if the Code of Judicial Conduct is applicable, the 
trial court erred by failing to give effect to the entire 
code. (See Exhibit K.) 
Specifically, the trial court relied on Canon 3C 
which states: 
A Judge should disqualify himself in a 
proceeding in which his impartiality 
might reasonably be questioned . . . 
However, the trial court erred, as a matter of 
law, by failing to give effect to other related sections of 
the Code, Section 3C(l)(c) further clarifies that an 
appearance of bias arises when: 
[H]e knows that he, individually or as a 
fiduciary, or his spouse or minor child 
residing in his household, has a finan-
cial interest in the subject matter in 
controversy . . . that could be substan-
tively affected by the outcome of the 
proceeding: [Emphasis added.] 
Thereafter, Section 3(C)(3)(c) explains that: 
"financial interest" means ownership of 
a legal or equitable interest, howeverf 
small . . . except that . . . (iii) the 
proprietary interest of a policy holder 
in a mutual insurance company, of a 
depositor in a mutual savings assn. or 
similar proprietary interest is a 
"financial interest" in the organization 
only if the outcome of the proceedings 
could substantially affect the value of 
the interest . . . [Emphasis added.] 
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In this case, the named plaintiff, Madsen, won a 
judgment of approximately $134. If Judge Rigtrup had some 
theoretical claim, it would probably be in that same range. 
It is not likely that Judge Rigtrup would sell his 
soul—or his good reputation for $134. Furthermore, the 
Code of Judicial Conduct clearly excludes such trivia. The 
United States Supreme Court has ruled squarely on this 
issue. On April 22, 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Aetna Ins. Co. v. LaVoie, 106 S.Ct. 1580 (1986) . The LaVoie 
case is attached as Exhibit L. In LaVoie, the appellant 
sought to disqualify Justice Embry of the Alabama Supreme 
Court. The claim against Justice Embry was that he had 
already filed a personal lawsuit virtually identical to the 
suit at bare The U.S. Supreme Court disqualified Justice 
Embry. The Court reasoned? 
We hold simply that when Justice Embry 
made that judgment, he acted as wa judge 
in his own case." 
106 S. Ct. at 1586. 
Appellant further sought to disqualify the entire 
Alabama Supreme Court. Appellant claimed that members of 
the Court were potential members of a class action which 
would be affected by the ruling. On that issue, the U.S. 
Supreme Court ruled that: 
[W]hile these justices might 
conceivably have had a slight pecuniary 
interest, we find it impossible to 
characterize that interest as "direct, 
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary" 
[Citations omitted] . . . Any interest 
that they might have had when they 
passed on the rehearing motion was 
9 
clearly highly speculative and contin-
gent . . . With the proliferation of 
class actions involving broadly defined 
classes, the application of a constitu-
tional requirement of disqualification 
must be carefully limited. [Citation 
omitted.] 
106 S.Ct. at 1588. 
The ink is still wet on LaVoie. Moreover LaVoie 
is squarely in point. Finally, LaVoie makes good sense. 
There is just no reason to disqualify a judge who has some 
contingent speculative interest in a case involving only 
$134. The public is entitled to have respect for its 
judges. But the public is not so gullible as to believe 
that judges sell out for the prospect of maybe someday 
getting $134. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT PUNISHED THE WRONG PARTY FOR 
THE ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
If Judge Rigtrup violated an ethical canon, he 
should be punished. Canon 3B(3) of the Code of Judicial 
Conduct states that: 
A Judge should take or initiate appro-
priate disciplinary measures against a 
judge or lawyer for unprofessional 
conduct of which the judge may become 
aware. [Emphasis added.] 
Indeed, Article VIII, Section 13 of the Utah Constitution 
(Exhibit F) sets up the procedure for disciplining a judge. 
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In this case Judge Rigtrup was not punished at 
alio Rather, the court imposed a drastic financial penalty 
on a wholly innocent party—the plaintiff s* It will be 
expensive to redo years of Judge Rigtrupfs work. Indeed, 
plaintiff's expert witness fees were over $20,000 before the 
trial even started (R. 347.) 
In summary, the alleged wrongdoer (Judge Rigtrup) 
gets off "scott free." On the other hand, an innocent party 
(plaintiff) is severely penalized in time and money for 
Judge Rigtrup's alleged faults. 
This court should rule, as a matter of law, that 
innocent parties should not be penalized when a judge 
violates his ethical duties. 
POINT V 
THE ERROR, IF ANY, WAS WAIVED 
Judge Rigtrup claims that he had disclosed any 
potential bias several years ago. There is some conflict 
over whether or not Judge Rigtrup did make that early 
disclosure. (See Statement of the Case.) 
However, there is no dispute that Judge Rigtrup 
did disclose any potential bias at trial and before any 
decision was announced. (See generally Exhibit A.) 
When Judge Rigtrup announced the potential bias at 
trial, Prudential waited to see who would win. Then 
thirty-nine days after the trial, Prudential finally filed 
its motion to disqualify Judge Rigtrup. 
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Plaintiff has located no case in history (in the 
U.Se or elsewhere) where a party, knowing of the grounds for 
disqualification, could gamble on the outcome of a case and 
then have the judge disqualified after the decision. 
Rather, the law is that a party, having knowledge 
of facts, that would be grounds for disqualification, must 
assert his objection before the judge rules on the merits of 
the case; e.g., Carpenter v. State, 575 P.2d 26 (Kan., 
1978); Jones v. Stivers, 447 S.W.2d 869 (Ky., 1969); In Re: 
United Shoe Machinery, 276 F.2d 77 (1st Cir., 1960); Keating 
v. Superior Court, 289 P.2d 209 (Cal. 1955); Aker v. 
Coleman, 88 P.2d 869 (Id., 1939); State et. rel. Shufeldt v. 
Armigo, 50 P.2d 852 (New Mex., 1935); Rademacher v. City of 
Phoenix, 442 F. Supp. 27 (D. Ariz., 1977); Williams Mauseth 
Insurance Brokers, Inc., v. Chappie, 524 P.2d 431 (Wash. 
App. 1974). 
Here are some typical examples of the Rule: 
A litigant who for the first time 
during trial learns of grounds for 
disqualification must promptly make his 
objection known as by moving for a 
mistrial . . . He may not, after learn-
ing of the grounds for disqualification, 
proceed with the trial until the court 
rules adversely to him and then claim 
the judge is disqualified. 
Williams Mauseth Insurance Brokers, 
Inc. v. Chappie, 524 P.2d 431, 434 
(Wash. App. 1974). 
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One may not gamble on a favorable 
ruling and then move for disqualifica-
tion upon receiving an adverse order. 
Lagies v. Copley, 110 Ca. App« 3d 
958, 966, 168 Cal. Rptr. 368, 372 
(1980) . 
* * * * 
A party "is not permitted to wait 
until he sees which way the decision is 
going before deciding whether to stay 
with or try to eliminate the judge." 
West v, Superior Court, 448 P.2d 57 
(Ariz. 1968) . 
POINT VI 
PRUDENTIAL HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY 
TO MAKE A TIMELY OBJECTION 
We have noted, above, that Prudential waited 
thirty-nine days before objecting to Judge Rigtrup sitting 
on the case. On that subject the trial court ruled that: 
In reviewing the transcript, this court 
concludes that counsel for the defendant 
could not be expected to interrupt the 
proceedings to file an affidavit of 
prejudice. (R. 239.) 
Nothing could be further from the truth. A fair 
reading of the transcript (Exhibit A) shows that Judge 
Rigtrup conducted the hearing with great dignity and 
courtesy. Prudential's counsel was in no sense cut off. 
Specifically, Prudential's counsel addressed the court on 
IL-fltf) ^Q^mr*- separate occasions during the closing minutes of the 
hearing. (See Exhibit A.) On any of those eleven occasions, 
Prudential merely had to say, "we object". Indeed, at the 
end of the hearing, Judge Rigtrup stated: "Do you desire to 
take any further exceptions to my openness and candor?" 
(See Exhibit A at p. 509.) Despite that invitation, 
Prudential remained silent! 
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What the record shows is simply that Prudential 
decided to "wait and see" what the ruling was. Indeed, 
Prudential's counsel agreed that Judge Rigtrup could pro-
ceed: 
MR. PALMER: No prejudice arose in 
the court1 s mind because of the fact 
that we collected a mortgage escrow from 
you? 
THE COURT: No. 
MR. PALMER: Okay. I can't do 
anything else but ask. 
(Exhibit A at pp.496 and 497.) 
Of course Prudential could have done something 
else. Prudential could have used the magic words: "we 
object." 
This is not a case where the trial court weighed 
conflicting evidence. The trial transcript is before the 
court. There is simply no evidence that the Judge somehow 
interfered with Prudential's counsel. 
POINT VII 
PRUDENTIAL HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO 
CONSULT WITH ITS CLIENT REGARDING DISQUALIFICATION 
Prudential's next excuse for the thirty-nine day 
delay was that counsel had to confer with the client. The 
trial court bought that argument hook, line and sinker. The 
court ruled: 
when Judge Rigtrup made his 
statements about being a former borrower 
of Prudential . . . insufficient notice 
was given to Prudential's counsel of the 
fact to allow counsel to confer with his 
client to determine the appropriate 
course of action. (R. 239.) 
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The argument is frivolous. The appropriate 
procedure would have been to move for a continuance? prepare 
the necessary paperwork? and file the papers prior to 
receiving the ruling. Rather, Prudential wanted to gamble 
on a favorable ruling—and decide on disqualification later. 
Moreover, Prudential's executive vice president 
was in the courtroom at all times• (See Exhibit I.) 
Counsel could have consulted with him during a break. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO 
APPLY THE CORRECT BURDEN OF PROOF 
In each of the prior points, it has been assumed, 
arguendo, that Judge Rigtrup did not disclose his relation-
ship with Prudential before the trial. However, there is 
substantial evidence in the Record that Judge Rigtrup did, 
in fact, disclose that relationship years earlier. 
To begin with, Judge Rigtrup testified that: 
THE COURT: As I've indicated 
earlier, and no objection was inter-
posed, I was a customer of Prudential 
Federal Savings and Loan Association and 
paid without default for 25 years at 
four and three-quarters percent, and I 
knew that was such a fine deal that my 
wife couldn't get me to remodel or move 
or anything because I was 23 years old 
when I first took the mortgage out, and 
I computed that out and I thought, why, 
those robbers, they are charging me 
twice what I'm borrowing from them, and 
that's unfair. As I got older and more 
sophisticated, I — 
15 
MR. PALMER: Your Honor, I hate to 
interrupt, but I need to make the point 
that this is news to me, that you had 
been a customer of Prudential. 
THE COURT: I indicated that on 
several occasions. 
MR. PALMER: I beg the Court's 
pardon, but that is news to me. I don't 
recall that at all—if anybody else 
does—recall telling me that, and I— 
THE COURT: I indicated that in 
these earlier meetings that I had paid 
my loan off at some point and Ifd had a 
loan with Prudential Federal Savings. 
(Exhibit A at pp.494 and 495.) 
Before the decision was announced, counsel for 
Madsen testified: 
MR. DEBRY: I do recall some 
conversation, I think, off the record, 
of that effect, and I honestly don't 
recall who was present. But it was a 
comment that was made from time to time. 
(Exhibit A at p.495.) 
In addition, counsel for Prudential testified 
that: 
I remember Judge Rigtrup disclosed in 
chambers, with other counsel present 
and approximately two years ago, that he 
had a mortgage with a reserve account, 
but heQ did not say it was with Pruden-
tial. 8 
(R. 117.) 
Q 
It should be remembered that plaintiff had 
already alleged a new defendant class of all lenders in 
Utah. Thus it must have been apparent that Judge Rigtrup 
was a potential party—or a potential member of that larger 
class. (See Point IB, above.) Nevertheless, no one 
objected. 
16 
At least one other disinterested party has testi-
fied? 
I recall that at some point in the 
proceedings over which he presided, 
Judge Rigtrup indicated that he had an 
old, low-interest mortgage loan which 
contained a reserve account clause. He 
further ruled that he would be able to 
rule objectively in these matters 
despite that fact. I recall that he 
asked if anyone had any objections to 
his sitting on these cases. I do not 
recall anyone so objecting. (Exhibit 
J.) 
Faced with this testimony, Judge Fishier said he 
simply couldn't make up his mind: 
I am going to find that neither party 
has established any preponderance of 
evidence that Judge Rigtrup either dis-
closed or did not disclose any interest 
that he might have had. (R. 804-805.) 
* * * * 
I think the next issue has got to be the 
timeliness issue, and I'm going to rule 
now that to me the evidence is evenly 
balanced as to whether or not there was 
a disclosure. (R. 864.) 
In its final order, the trial court allocated the 
burden on Madsen. Thus the evidence was evenly balanced; 
but since Madsen had the burden, Madsen lost: 
The Court has reviewed the Affidavits on 
file, which are conflicting. A remittal 
of disqualification is in effect an 
affirmative defense to the Motion to 
Disqualify a sitting judge. In review-
ing the record, the Court can find 
nothing which persuades it by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that there was a 
remittal of the disqualification. 
(Exhibit B at p.4.) 
17 
However, the law is to the contrary, A judge is 
presumed to be fair and to conduct proceedings with imparti-
ality. One who challenges the regularity of the court1s 
proceedings has the burden of proof. See In Re: Interna-
tional Business Machines Corp., 618 F.2d 923, 932 & 934 (2nd 
Cir. 1980); In Re; Union Leader Corp., 292 F.2d 381, 389 
(1st Cir. 1961); Matter of Estate of Baird, 406 N.E.2d 1323, 
1331 (Ind. App. 1980); Mayo v. Beber, 2 Cal. Rptr. 405, 409 
(1960); Bass v. Minich, 109 S.W.2d 139, 140 (Ark. 1937). 
In summary, the trial court placed the burden of 
proof on the wrong party. 
POINT IX 
IF JUDGE RIGTRUP IS DISQUALIFIED, THAT 
SHOULD NOT VOID ALL OF HIS PRIOR RULINGS 
After the trial, the Court issued its ruling from 
the bench. However, before the formal findings of fact were 
signed, Prudential filed its motion to disqualify Judge 
Rigtrup. 
If Judge Rigtrup is disqualified, the parties need 
not be put to the expense of a new trial. It should be 
sufficient for a new judge to take over after the findings 
of fact have been entered. 
It is the general rule that the judicial 
act of a disqualified judge is voidable 
but not void . . . According to the 
weight of authority, at Common Law, the 
18 
acts of a disqualified judge are not 
nullities; they are simply erroneous and 
liable to be avoided or reversed on 
proper application, although they cannot 
be impeached collaterally • . . 
46 Am. Jur. 2d, Judges, §231. 
* * * * 
Disqualification from presiding over a 
particular case does not disqualify 
the Judge from otherwise holding the 
part of term which is occupied by the 
trial . . . or from ruling on those 
matters under submission. 
156 C.J.S. Judges. 
In addition, Madsen relies on the case of Coastal 
Petroleum Co. v. Mobile Oil Corp., 378 So.2d 336 (Fla. App. 
1980) . That case is very similar to the Madsen case. In 
Coastal, the judge heard the trial, and announced the sub-
stance of his rulings. Thereafter, motions were made for 
recusal. The judge did recuse himself from hearing addi-
tional matters not yet tried. However the judge reserved 
jurisdiction to enter a final ruling on the matters already 
tried and under submission. The appellate court upheld the 
ruling. See also Martys Floor Covering v. GAF Corp., 604 
F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1979). "Only prospective relief is 
afforded by this section. It cannot be used as a means of 
obtaining a new trial." 
19 
CONCLUSION 
It is absolutely true that the public should be 
protected from biased judges. But it is equally true, that 
the public should be protected from judge-shopping. Indeed 
our statutes provide: 
If an application for an order, made to 
a judge of a court in which the action 
or proceeding is pending, is refused in 
whole or in part, or is granted condi-
tionally, no subsequent application for 
the same order can be made to any other 
judge, except of a higher court. 
Utah Code Annotated, §78-7-19. 
Prudential's attempt to disqualify Judge Rigtrup 
after losing the case is thinly veiled attempt to violate 
§78-7-19. 
DATED this ' 7 day of _^ , 1986. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By: 
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iiAHltn. 
the convenience of the record for closings? 
2 J MR. DeBRY: We are prepared to proceed with 
3 closing at the convenience of the Court. If it !s getting 
4 late — 
5 THE COURT: I fm just, talking about the 
6 record. 
7 MR. DeBRY: Oh, we don't need a reporter. 
3 MR. PALMER: You mean for closing arguments? 
9 J Oh, I think it should be reported, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Very well. 
[Whereupon, closing arguments were presented 
to the Court by respective counsel.] 
THE COURT: I had thought earlier that 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 I might go home and spend some time with the case, but 
15 
16 
I've decided that I'd rather let you gentlemen twist 
and turn for the weekend rather than me. So I 111 share 
17 j the benefits of my decision with you at this point. 
18 ( The difficultyof the case is not because 
19 j of the battle of the experts, and I think I !ve got some 
20 valuable training in that at the Public Service Commission, 
21 I suppose that has a personal flavor, because I respect 
22 both of these gentlemen. I like both of them. And the 
23 difficulty is that they react like former fellow Public 
24 Service commissioners, they will take my opinion or my 
25 ruling or my view as a personal affront to them, maybe. 
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i And that's certainly unfortunate. That !s not why the 
2 case is a problem to the Court. I have had incremental 
3 kinds of suffering for four years in that these two lawyersj 
4 have tested me, they have twisted me and they have pulled 
5 and tugged me and jerked and proposed every conceivable 
6 concept that you could come up with, and the substance — 
7 I fll expose my biases and my prejudices and be very frank 
8 with you. 
9 I think there are some substantial kinds 
10 of policy things that have really caused me great trouble 
n and trauma. As I've indicated earlier, and no objection 
12 was interposed, I was a customer of Prudential Federal 
13 Savings & Loan Association and paid without default for 
14 25 years at four and three-quarters per cent, and I knew 
15 that was such a fine deal that my wife couldn !t get to 
16 remodel or move or anything because I was 23years old 
17 when I first took the.mortgage out, and I computed that 
18 out and I thought, why, those robbers, they are charging 
19 me twice what I'm borrowing from them, and that's unfair. 
20 As I get older and more sophisticated I — 
21 U MR. PALMER: Your Honor, I hate to interrupt,] 
22 but I need to make the point that this is news to me, 
23 that you had been a customer of Prudential. 
24 THE COURT: I indicated that on several 
25 occasions. 
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1
 ?-* MR. PALMER: I beg the Court's pardon, 
2 but that is news to me. I don't recall that at all — 
3 if anybody else does — recall you telling me that, and 
4 I ~ 
5
 THE COURT: I indicated that in these earlier) 
6 meetings that I had paid my loan off at some point, and 
I'd had a loan with Prudential Federal Savings. 
8
 i - N MR. PALMER: Perhaps the Court is thinking 
9 of conferences with other counsel. The reason I make 
10 | the point is — 
11
 I THE COURT: My earlier conferences were 
12 not with the two of you in this case, they were with 
13 I Mr- Billings, with Mr. Ashton, with you, with Mr- Giauque, 
14 J Mr. McDonough, with respect to whoever he represents. 
15 I It was Mr. Giauque or someone from that office. They 
16 j were a corrective kind of a deal. 
17
 J MR. PALMER: In any event, I stand to raise 
the point now that it is news to us. I believe it — 
I take it that the Court did not feel that it had any 
prejudice because of that. 
21
 I THE COURT: No. 
22
 ) MR. PALMER: All right. 
THE COURT: I have a recollection that 
somewhere along the line I did make that disclosure. 
I don!t know how you could be part of the community and 
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be a homeowner and not have borrowed from someone. And 
2 I so I think I make it very clear in one of those collective 
3 kinds of meetings that my loan had been with Prudential 
4 Federal. 
5 ) At any rate, it's a fact, and it was somethinjg 
6 that I never tried to hide or have hid from anyone. So 
7 J there's no sense of covering up. I guess if that creates 
error, it creates error. But so be it. I have a recollectjion 
9 | that I did expose it, and whether you were there or 
Mr. Lewis or anyone else, I don't know. I did make the 
disclosure early on. 
MR. DeBRY: I do recall some converstions, 
I think, off the record, of that effect, and I honestly 
don't recall who was present. But it was a comment that 
was made from time to time. 
MR. PALMER: Could I inquire of the Court 
17 I when the loan was paid off? 
18 THE COURT: Probably two years ago. I'm 
19 not sure at what pint in the discussions I indicated 
20 that, but I'm sure that in the presence of the collective 
21 group that I indicated that I had been a borrower of 
22 Prudential Federal Savings. 
23 MR* PALMER: No prejudice arose in the 
24 Court's mind because of the fact that we collected a 
25 mortgage escrow from you? 
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1 THE COURT: No. 
2 MR. PALMER: Okay. I can't do anything 
3 else but ask. 
4 THE COURT: That!s what Ifve been trying 
5 to tell you. That was the intention. 
6 MR. PALMER: I make the point because I 
7 didn!t want to go on and let the Court note — 
8 THE COURT: I think I've made general commentjs 
9 J throughout that I have cussed financial institutions, 
and customers do simply because they see inherent injustice) 
about that. And my perspective today, after 23 years 
has passed, has become much, much different at the end 
of the 23 years. Far before that I could see the cost 
of money was markedly greater, and that I would be a 
damn fool to prepay. So I paid faithfully every month 
for 25 years, and not a day sooner or a day later. And 
I'm just commenting generally in terms of unjust or whatevejr 
18 I The tension is between that to be gained and that to 
19 be lost, I suppose, in my eyes. And I have a feeling 
20 that class actions are a form of champerty in maintenance 
21 in that the one that substantially gains is the lawyer 
22 or the expert. Mr. Madsen stands to gain little, except 
23 he has struck a blow for freedom, I suppose, in the form 
24 that the consumer has achieved balance. 
25 Be seated, Mr. DeBry. 
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1 MR. DeBRY: I want to make an objection 
2 on the record. I really must. 
3 THE COURT: Well, sit down. 
4 MR. DeBRY: Before you give your decision, 
5 I must make a comment, because I know the Court is being 
6 candid and this has been a long struggle, and Prudential 
7 says they are almost broke before this* And you say 
8 maybe DeBry will make some money, but I haven't yet. 
9 But I really must interpose an objection at this point. 
10 If the Court harbors this type of personal bias with 
11 respect to — 
12 
13 
15 
THE COURT: I'm just — 
MR. DeBRY: — class actions. 
14 THE COURT: I'm just telling you about 
the tension. 
16 MR. DeBRY: I must object to the Court's 
17 sitting on this case if you have that kind of bias. 
18 THE COURT: I'm just telling you why I'm 
19 getting to my ruling and how I'm getting to my ruling 
20 and being open and candid with both of you. But that's 
21 a built-in problem with class actions. They have achieved 
22 a beneficial result. The difficult I am locked into is 
23 that I have got to follow the law of the case. I have 
24 got the Supreme Court that's telling me what to do. I 
25 have got a prior trial judge that's told me what to do 
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1
 as well, and the law is clear that I have got to do what 
2 Judge Croft told me to do, because he has ruled on the 
3
 issue. I have got to do what the Supreme Court ahs told 
4
 me to do, because they have ruled on the issue. And 
5 independent of what my personal thoughts or beliefs 
6
 are, Ifm caught in a catch 22, and there is a realistic 
7 tension in that process. 
8 The tension is that in terms of the magnitude! 
9 of the wear, what is to be gained by Mr. Madsen is 
10 de minimis. On the other hand, if the Court looks at 
11 economic realities, the high cost of money, high cost 
12 of labor and high cost of everything else, there is a 
13 J societal interest in maintaining healthy, vital financial 
institutions that have the ability to fund building 
15 I construction, homes, and so forth, in our community. 
16 J And I simply observe that probably the savings and loan 
associations have been very instrumental and important 
in that particular process. I simply make those as an 
overview statement sayto what has troubled me, and it's 
trouble me for a long time. 
That's why I have invited you two to sit 
down and strike a settlement, rather than impress that 
23 I heavy burden upon me. 
24 Sit down, Mr. DeBry. 
25 MR. DeBRY: Your Honor — 
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1 THE COURT: You can take exceptions after 
2 I get done. I'm trying to —-
3 MR. DeBRY: I might note that I do have 
4 an exception to take at this time before you give your 
5 I verdict in this matter. 
6 THE COURT: I haven't given a verdict. 
7 MR. DeBRY: With respect to class actions. 
8 THE COURT: I understand. That's where 
9 the tension lies. And it's a troublesome decision. It's 
10 bothered me for a long time. 
n This is basically a contract case. It's 
12 a contract that was executed by people in Utah, to be 
13 performed in Utah. It's not a federal case. It's not 
14 a federal regulation case. The federal courts sent it 
15 back to Utah to be resolved in the Utah courts. My 
16 predecessor, Judge Croft, certified it as a class action. 
17 I'm not the appellate court. I can't reverse Judge Croft 
18 and until the Supreme Court corrects that as an error, 
19 if it is, it's a class action. It has been certified 
20 and it is the function of this case as I ruled, and as 
21 I think I'm compelled to rule, that as the Supreme Court 
22 said, as a matter of contract law, the language contained 
23 in the contract in question created a pledge, and that 
24 based upon that pledge, Mr. Madsen and his wife were 
25 entitled to an accounting for profits made, and were 
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entitled, at minimum, to an offset against their indebtedne 
or I'd assume it would follow, a disgorgement of those 
profits. 
I view that as the law of the case, and 
inescapable- I also don't view this, even though cast 
in the context of unjust enrichment, it gives me the 
prerogative of trying the case based upon just and unjust 
in terms of enrichment. 
The Supreme Court says that the Madsens 
are entitled to an accounting for profits, so that is 
what I think I am obliged to follow. Ifm not troubled 
at all by burden of proof. As far as I see day in and 
day out, the concept was told over and over and over 
to me as a lawyer, as I-practiced in these courts, by 
D. Frank Wilkins in his rule, which was "He who alleges, 
must prove." 
That is the basic fundamental rule in this 
case. And the Court, given those limitations and 
restrictions, had been tortured in terms of the decisional 
process in this matter. Whether one becomes an expert 
or one does not, it's not a requirement or prerequisite 
that you abandon common sense. Mr. Norman knows that 
I graduated in accounting. So I do have some background. 
I think too much, at times, is made of 
the fact that it almost rises to a point of science rather 
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than an art, though you use the term art. And I guess 
the best common sense example of why I perceive there 
is some overkill in the area is that I was a farm boy, 
and farmers, with the corner of their shopping bag and 
a lead pencil, could do more in 15 minutes grappling 
with weather, grappling with soil conditions, grappling 
with fertilizing problems, grappling with a choice of 
seeds and all that they have to program in, and still 
persist in that activity day in and day out. And that's 
something which seems to me could confound enough cost 
accountants to circle the globe- It's not a science, 
itfs an exercise in judgment. 
And it seems to me that if the conclusions 
that are followed by the cost accounting approach are 
followed, management would have failed a long time ago. 
The funds are and have been of benefit to Prudential 
Federal Savings & Loan over the years. They provide 
a base over which to spread costs. They provide a hedge 
against default, and provide security. 
I realize there are some federal regulations 
about that, though Prudential, as did other savings and 
loans, banks, and other institutions, followed the state 
statute in terms of turning that practice around. And 
as I recall, part of the regulation provided that state 
law could be files. But if in the last years when costs, 
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1 as you indicated, Mr. Norman, went up enormously — as 
2 they did — Prudential Federal, if it really strictly 
3 followed that analysis, would have somehow found a lower 
4 cost alternative rather than keep a loss leader. I give 
5 them more credit than that. 
6 There were certainly triple A accounts 
7 that weren't collection problems in those accounts. And 
g I as to those, I would submit that they would have found 
g some sort of service bureau, or whatever, to perform 
that function. The generation of deposits, the generation 
of loans are essential productive features of their 
bueiness. The function of escrow accounts is a nonessential 
function, other than as they perceive it to be essential 
14 I by virtue of federal regulations. And the process of 
15 billing, receiving payments, and many of those other 
1§ things is not greatly different,with or without escrow 
17 accounts. 
18 The Court is persuaded of that clearly 
19 and convincingly by a preponderance of the evidence. 
20 It follows as night the day. 
2i I had experience as a young lawyer, going 
22 out and opening an office, of doing a lot of collection 
23 work. You do get established, and one lawyer and one 
24 good secretary can push an awful lot of volume and paper, 
25 and that was before word processing and the fine things 
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1 that lawyers have today. We understood that there ere 
2 lithographs and other ways to maybe accomplish these 
3 things in a less efficient way, but nonetheless, you 
4 learn in a short time how to handle great volumes of 
5 paperwork with a very small amount of people. 
5 Ifm convinced in a very persuasive way 
7 that the function of servicing escrow accounts is not 
8 a monumental task, and that it can be achieved by a relatively 
9 small amount of people. Once you shift from an escrow 
10 environment to a nonescrow environment, many of the functicjns 
n that are performed in that department aren't going to 
12 be greatly diminished. They are going to keep the building), 
13 they are going to keep the data processing capabilities, 
14 and I'm really persuaded by Mr. Stewart!s analysis that 
15 if you have an appropriate allocation, it more common-
15 sensically follows that those costs be attributed to 
17 the productive aspects of the business. 
18 It does not appear to be rational at all, 
19 as per Exhibit 8, that costs would escalate in that fashion! 
20 and they would still maintain that function without making 
21 some big corrections. 
22 I think Mr. Norman and Mr. Stewart would 
23 both recognize the judgment aspect of any allocation 
24 process, and I think they would both recognize that they 
25 neither one may have the perfect solution or all of the 
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answers. 
I think they both would be candid, and 
I respect them for both being honest and upfront. If 
the computerized and mechanization process added such 
a heavy burden to the cost, it would have been a better 
management decision to persist with shoe boxes and a 
mechanical process, rather than allowing the costs to 
double in a short period of time when the benefit to 
be gained was as minimal as it was. 
I think, moreover, Mr. Stewart's analysis 
of the escrow account balances were, as I recall, in 
the range of 20 per cent lower. I don't know whether 
that!s more accurate or less accurate than your analysis, 
Mr. Norman, except that it demonstrates a conservative 
bias in favor of Prudential Federal rather than Mr. Madsen, 
There was something said about working 
capital, that it also seems to me there is — I think 
it's maybe unrealistic and idealistic to think that there 
is instantaneous management of those funds, and there 
may be a little bias in the analysis of Mr. Stewart, 
and there is some justification of working capital slack. 
Moreover, given the high interest rates and the levels 
we're talking about, management doesn't let large amounts 
of uninvested funds go for 60 days, and they are moving 
them into a mode of investment where they can derive 
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1 daily yield-kind of investments at times to keep the 
2 funds working. As for the assignment of a lot of costs, 
3 I'm impressed that the building is a sunk cost, and the 
4 assignment of a large amount of that really doesn!t track 
5 I the function. 
I'm convinced that advertising to generate 
7 I the productive aspect of the business; namely, loans 
3 and deposits, doesn't have as part of its function to 
9 J generate escrow business. They are not in the business, 
really, of providing escrow business as a primary function 
And I think the bulk of the high level management decisions) 
really aren't involved in managing day-to-day escrow 
decisions. It seems to the Court that most of that is 
H I clerical and doesn't require the highest order of skills. 
15 The high order of skills are more required, 
16 though, in terms of investment decisions and things of 
17 that kind. So to apportion a substantial portion of 
18 I that to that process appears to the court to be non founded! 
19 I in common sense. ! 
20 There were other specific things that I 
21 think are of similar rationality as far as I view the 
22 overall record. If the Court feels it had an unjust 
23 enrichment kind of case, I think the Court would find 
24 the decision easy. But my perception is that I am locked 
25 in by a decision of the Supreme Court that simply found 
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j it to be a pledge, and that those funds had to be accounted 
2 for to the customer. And it's that plain and simple, 
3 and it's put me in a tortuous kind of position that, 
4 J notwithstanding my underlying biases and feelings, I 
5 i feel that I have no choice 
6 I I think there have been errors in both 
7 analyses in one way or another, but in thinking about 
8 it all, the court finds and concludes that the approach 
9 that Mr. Stewart took in his Schedule 7, which uses the 
short-term T-bill rate more closely approximates the 
short period of turnover with escrow accounts and the 
investment options. And the court finds it reasonable 
13 to conclude that on the Madsen account, during the period 
from March 3, 1971 through June 30, 1979, that there 
15 I was total cumulative earnings on the Madsen account earned 
of $109.43. And that it would further be appropriate, 
as a finding,that as a matter of fact, that the Madsens 
18 I would have a total cumulative effect of earnings on those 
19 funds bringing the total to $13 4.70. 
20 MR. PALMER: $134.70? 
21 THE COURT: Yes. Plaintiffs, accordingly, 
22 are awarded judgment for $134.70 plus allowable costs. 
23 And with respect to the mechanics, I haven't worked out 
24 anything with respect to the overall class impact it 
25 would have. So the issue of what the ramifications are 
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on a class basis are reserved for future consideration 
to be determined, with both of you to have an opportunity 
to review those matters as to how that should work out. 
MR. PALMER: Could I inquire, when the 
Court says that if this were an unjust enrichment case, 
the decision would be easy, what the Court means by that? 
THE COURT: I really -— my visceral reaction 
is that I don't feel there's unjust enrichment. 
MR. DeBRY: Well, with that being said, 
however, in the context that in this case we didn't put 
on any evidence as to that. 
THE COURT: I make no finding thereon. 
I'm being candid with both of you. It's a tortuous process) 
for me. I think economic reality, considering all interests 
involved, even though corporations make profits and so 
forth, it bothers me, that bottom-line result, if I'm 
affirmed. But I think the evidence dictates that I must 
find otherwise. 
MR. PALMER: All right. I anticipate, 
or I would have anticipated that regardless of which 
side prevails at this point, that there would be an appeal 
THE COURT: I certainly recognize that, 
and that's why I made the comments the second day, that 
the two experts perhaps could bring some reason and 
rationality to the thing, because of the enormous cost. 
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1 It's been a burdensome thing and it's not easy for Mr. DeBr^j 
2 to carry the battle, and it's been a very costly one 
3 for him going forward, and a very costly process for 
4 Prudential to defend. And I sort of think that once 
5 this statute was amended to allow the customer the choice 
6 of one thing or the other,the battle, to a large measure, 
7 had been fairly won. But I don't think I have any choices 
g From all of my rambling, Mr. DeBry, can 
g you draft an intelligent set of findings, conclusions 
10 and whatever? 
n MR- EeBRY: Yes. Thank you. 
12 THE COURT: Do you desire to make any further] 
^ exceptions to my — 
14 MR. DeBRY: No, your Honor. 
15 THE COURT: ~ my openness and candor? 
16 MR. DeBRY: No. 
17 |^ MR. PALMER: Well, what I'm suggesting 
18 is that I expect that there will be an appeal before 
19 w e <?et into the class issues, and I would anticipate 
20 findings and a judgment be presently entered in favor 
21 of Mr. Madsen. 
22 MR- DeBRY: Well, perhaps that's a job 
23 for another day. We'll have to take your ruling and 
24 think about it and decide. We'll suggest to the Court 
25 what further steps are indicated. 
tf' 
50 9-jVp> 
11 
12 
1 THE COURT: Would you submit that to 
2 Mr. Palmer? 
3 MR. DeBRY: Yes. ! 
I I 
4 THE COURT: In advance, and allow me some J 
» 
5 leeway. I have got a month-long trial set for October, j 
! 
6 and so I'm going to be locked in to that time-wise. And j 
i 
7 if you've got objections or whatever, if we can get hearings 
i 
8 early in the morning or late in the afternoon, I111 certainly 
9 be able to accommodate those kinds of things. 
10 The reporter gets to go home at 5:00 on 
usual business, though I'll note for the record that 
it1s now 5:58. 
13 I MR. DeBRY: We thank the Court and staff 
14 for your attention and the courtesies extended. 
15 THE COURT: It's been a stimulating and 
16 challenging experience, but it really is not a very easy 
17 process, because it seems to me that the Court is in 
18 a position that clearly,in a case like that, you can't 
19 help but be damned if you do and damned if you don't, 
20 in either respect. And it's not a half-a-loaf kind of 
21 a case. 
22 I realize that taking the lower figure 
23 of Mr. Stewart may appear to be that way, but I recognize 
24 that there are some reasonable areas that you could criticize 
25 maybe some of the assumptions he made, as well as those 
siaO 
\ > 
of Mr. Norman. 
2 I We111 be i n r e c e s s . 
3 [Evening r e c e s s commencing a t 5:58 p . m . ] 
4 -ooOoo-
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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JAN 16 1986 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Clerk 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for 
themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. 226073 
This case comes before the Court as a class action brought 
by plaintiffs seeking to have Judgment against the defendant 
Prudential for interest on money held by Prudential in reserve 
accounts. 
The case was tried before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup, 
District Judge, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of 
the evidence and arguments of counsel, Judge Rigtrup commented 
from the bench on several subjects, and indicated his decision 
based upon the law and evidence. 
Prior to the signing and filing of Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Judgment, the defendant Prudential moved to have 
Judge Rigtrup disqualified. Thereafter, the issue of Judge 
Rigtrup1s disqualification was referred to this division of 
the Court for resolution. 
*ADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
The plaintiffs have raised the issue of timeliness, claiming 
that defense counsel did not raise his objection to Judge Rigtrup 
bearing the case in a timely fashion. In reviewing the transcript 
Df the proceedings before Judge Rigtrup on September 5, 1985, 
it is clear that Judge Rigtrup was about to rule, and that when 
Judge Rigtrup made his statements about being a former borrower 
of Prudential that insufficient notice was given to Prudential's 
counsel of this fact to allow counsel to confer with his client 
to determine the appropriate course of action. 
The filing of an Affidavit of Prejudice against the judge 
Before whom the client and attorney have a case pending is a 
serious matter and not one to be undertaken lightly, or without 
the client and the attorney conferring. In reviewing the transcript, 
this Court concludes that counsel for the defendant could not 
De. expected to interrupt the proceedings to file an Affidavit 
3f Prejudice. Therefore, the argument that the objection was 
lot timely is without merit. 
The next issue that must be addressed is whether the Judge 
In question was biased and prejudiced within the meaning of 
*ule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Utah Supreme 
:ourt in Haslam v. Morrison. 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948) 
aeld that actual bias and prejudice on the part of a judge dis-
jualifies that judge. The court stated: 
KADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE THREE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Bias and prejudice means a hostile feeling 
or spirit of ill will toward one of the 
litigants, or undue friendship or favoritism 
toward one* The fact that a judge may have 
an opinion as to the merits of the cause 
or that he has strong feelings about the 
type of litigation involved does not make 
him biased or prejudiced. 
L13 Utah at 20 
There have been no subsequent cases cited to this Court 
concerning the meaning of the term "biased and prejudiced." 
This Court notes, however, that subsequent to Haslam, supra, 
Rule 63 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was adopted by 
the Supreme Court of this state. More importantly, in 1974 
the Utah Supreme Court approved the Code of Judicial Conduct. 
Canon 3(c) provides that a judge should disqualify himself in 
a proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be ques-
tioned* 
This Court concludes that the impartiality of Judge Rigtrup 
might be reasonably questioned, and therefore Judge Rigtrup 
should have disqualified himself from hearing the issues raised 
in this case. 
It is disputed as to whether or not Judge Rigtrup would 
be a member of a potential class of individuals who may or may 
not have causes of action against Prudential. Although Judge 
Rigtrup is not a party to this litigation, it is conceivable 
that his rulings could be binding upon Prudential in other similar 
litigation in which Judge Rigtrup could be a plaintiff on a 
MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
theory of collateral estoppel. He may therefore have a financial 
interest which would be substantially affected by the outcome 
of the proceeding as defined under Canon 3(c)(1)(c). 
The litigants in this action have raised the issue of remittal 
of disqualification as defined under Canon 3(d). The Court 
has reviewed the Affidavits on file, which are conflicting. 
A remittal of disqualification is in effect an affirmative defense 
to the Motion to Disqualify a sitting judge. In reviewing the 
record, the Court can find nothing which persuades it by a prepon-
derance of the evidence that there was a remittal of the disquali-
fication. 
The Court concludes that the overwhelming weight of authority 
is that the disqualification should be retroactive, and this 
Court so holds. 
Lastly, this Court points out the advice of Justice Wade 
in Haslam, supra: 
One of the most important things in government 
is that all persons subject to its jurisdiction 
shall always be able to obtain a fair and 
impartial trial in all matters of litigation 
in its courts. It is nearly as important 
that the people have absolute confidence 
in the integrity of the courts. I can think 
of nothing that would as surely bring the 
courts into disrepute as for a judge to 
insist on trying a case where one of the 
litigants believes that such judge is biased 
and prejudiced against him. 
113 Utah at 25. 
MADSEN V. PRUDENTIAL PAGE FIVE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Since no Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law or Judgment 
have been entered in this case, and Judge Rigtrup has been dis-
qualified, a new trial will be held before a Judge to whom the 
case will be assigned. This assignment will be made known to 
the lawyers and litigants by way of a Minute Entry which will 
follow shortly. u*y 
Dated this vu dav of January, 1986. 
u 
PHILIP. R. FISHLER 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
By ... K CM&£zAQ£. 
Deputy ClerK 
Robert J. Debry 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake Citv, Utah 34107 
Telephone: (301) 262-3915 
Attorney for the Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SAL^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
• • * 
RICHARD MADSSN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for them-
selves and all others simi-
larly situated, 
LAKE COUNTY 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendant, 
UTAH 3ANKERS ASSOCIATION. 
ORDER 
Civil Nos. 225073 4 793404 
Judge Philip R. Fishle: 
* • • 
Prudential Federal Savings & Loan's Motion to Disquaii: 
the Honorable Kenneth R. Rigtrup, having come on for hearing, th: 
Court having heard evidence, considered the memoranda on file, a: 
being fully advised of the premisis, it is hereby ordered, ad^ ud-: 
and decreed that Judge Rigtrup be and he is hereby disqualified; 
And further that all prior rulings of Judge Rigtrup be 
and the same are hereby set aside on the ground and for the reas: 
that although there is no actual bias on the part of Judge Rigtr:. 
-here is an appearance of bias as set forth in the y.e-cra.-.iu-
Decision heretofore filed bv this Court. 
DATED this 2*^ day of /j?^****—! , 1 S35 
BY THE COURT: 
0rdjL. 
5hilip i. Fishier 
District Judge (Presicing! 
-2-
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H. SftR'.-Mf, EtANS. CLERK 
i i j i 2i5T COURT ,
 y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUf>f6i£i?^DlSTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo—— 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
-vs-
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS 
AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, 
ORDER 
Civil No. 226073 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The motion of the named plaintiffs for a determination 
that this action be maintained as a class action having come on 
to be heard, and the same having been duly considered by the 
Court after presentation of briefs and oral arguments by the 
parties, 
IT IS ORDERED, that the motion be and is hereby 
granted, and that this action shall be maintained as a class 
action pursuant to the provisions of Rule 23(a) and 23(b) (I) (A) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that the class represented by 
the named plaintiffs be and it is hereby certified as all persons 
who are presently parties to trust deed contracts with defendant 
wherein the contract provides that: 
"In addition to the monthly payments as 
provided in said note, the trustor agrees 
to pay to the beneficiary, upon the same 
day each month, budget payments estimated 
to equal one-twelfth of the annual taxes 
and insurance premiums? said budget pay-
ments to be adjusted from time to time as 
required, and said budget payments are 
hereby pledged to the beneficiary as 
additional security for the full performance 
of this deed of trust and the note secured 
thereby. The budget payments so accumulated 
may be withdrawn by the beneficiary for the 
payment of taxes or insurance premiums due 
JO 
/4
 « /> 
on the premises. The beneficiary may at 
any time, without notice, apply said budget 
payments to the payments of any sums due 
under the terms of this deed of trust and 
the note secured hereby or either of them. 
Trustors failure to pay said budget payments 
shall constitute a default under this trust." 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, that this class is maintained 
for the purpose of further proceedings to determine whether or 
not profits were derived from the use of the "budget payments" 
and, if so, to require an accounting for them to the plaintiffs. 
The maintenance of the class action shall be conditional upon 
the determination after a trial upon the merits that the 
defendant, by the use, if any, of the funds in plaintiffs' 
reserve account derived a profit from such use for which it 
must account to plaintiffs under the decision of the Supreme 
Court of Utah filed January 14, 1977 in this case. 
DATED this / 3 day of July, 1977. 
BY THE COURT: 
...-"S&Z ,4..,, ?// ri^h 
^
 v Bryant' vu Croft" "— / 
ST ^^^^^^osx** District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF_SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Order for the Judge's signature was served upon 
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq., attorney for defendant,- 600 Deseret Plaza 
15 East First South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, by U. S. mail, 
postage prepaid, this 7th day of July, 1977. 
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TTTAH 
MORTGAGE 
Turn Moeroao* made this 3rd day of «**l7 
huadndaad fifty-€ir;ht between 
Kenneth WLgtrup, aa uxamrried nee 
of Salt U k e , County of Sal t Wke
 tejrfflta*efTTah, 
Mortgagor, aad 
PRUDSfTIaL FEDERAL UVIKGS AHD LOU! ASSOCIATO* 
a corporation otgmaised aad existing under the laws of the Qnlted States of i a t r i c a 
WmrBaia: THAT Wsnoaas, the Mortgagor is indebted to the Mortgages»the yiieaiBil eoei of 
SLE-rSH THOUSIKD MINE HD5DRED AMD NO/100 -Deflaiefl 11,000.00 ).m 
evidenced by a prniiiiamrjr note, bearing even date herewith, for the payment of arid principal sua, with interest 
thereon at the rate of four three fourth* per eentua {U-3/k%) per ananm nutd paid; both principal 
mini aad the interest thereon being payable a monthly instsflaous at the times and a the aaounei as eat forth. 
in mid promissory note, iiietuae to whkh » here made, at the office of the Mortgagee a S a l t Lake 
or at each other piece as the bolder may designers m writmc dlefivered or mailed to the Mortgagor, the i 
mstaOment, if not sooner paid, to be o^aadpeyahtooathenrstdsy of 
Nov TaxazfOBs, for the pexpost of acuring prompt payment of aid sole, the Mnrtaejnr, far rainsas 
consideration, receipt of whkh it hereby scsmowkdged, doa hereby ™—+f«fj». eoavey, asaga, sad wane* asto the 
Mortgagee, the foflowardeseribed property, situated in Sal t Tr^ frt 
County of Salt T-*^ , aad State of Utah: 
Lot 28 , Eaet Hlllbrook Subdivision, according t o the plat thereof, recorded 
in the o f f i ce of the County Recorder of said County. 
together with all water rights, rights of way, easementa, tenements, lamditsaents and HUHIIUIMSIHIS thereunto 
iicioriiong, or in anywwe now or hereafter appertaining and ail rrnta, issues and profits thereof (provided, how<*v<*r, 
rb»t the Mortgagor nhail be entitled to ooUeet and retain the said rents, issue* and profits until default hereunder), 
ui.l ail tixtun*^  oow or hereafter attache*i to or used in connection with the premias henna described; and in addition 
:her*"o th.- .* .liuwing d*»wcribed household appliances, which are, and shall be deemed to be, fixtures and a part of 
f ivr realty, &n*i an* a poruon of the security for the uutebtednes* herein mentioned: 
The Mortgagor covenant* and agrees with the Mortgage* as follows: 
1. He- will promptly pay the principal of and interest on. the indebtedness evidenced by thii said note, at tba^ 
timet and in the «*»ww» therein provided. Privilege is 4tamed to prepay at any tone, without pieuiima or fan, 
the enure indebtedness or any part thereof not leaf than the amount of one installment, or one Uuiklierf'JDrattr1 
^$100.00), whichever is less. 
2. Tofrthcr with, and in addition to, the monthly payments of prmrir-d and interest payable under the terms 
of the note secured hereby, the Mortgagor wul pay to the Mortgagee, on the first day of each snath until the said 
note 1* fullv paid: 
(a) A sum equal to the ground rents, if any, next due, pins the premiums that will next become due and payable 
on policjCT of fire and other hazard insurance covering the mortgaged property, plus taxes and sawanwnents 
next due on the aicrtcaeed property (all as estimated by the Mortgagee, and ci which the Mortgagor 
is notified) less all sum* already paid therefor divided by the number of months to elapse before one 
month prior to the date when such ground rents, premiums, taxes and aesessments will \ 
such mms to be held by Mortgagee in trust to pay said ground rents, pi " 
before the same become delinquent. 
(b) The aggregate of the amounts payable pnrsnant to subparagraph (a) and those payable on the note secured 
hereby, shall be paid in a smgfc payment each month, to be applied-to the following items in the order 
stated: 
(1) pound rent*, taxes, assessments, fire sad other hazard insurance premiums; 
(u; intern* on the indebtedness 5reun.1l hereby; and 
(ii!) amortization of the principal of said indebtedness. 
Any deficiency in the amount of any audi aggregate monthly payment shall, unless made gpoo by the 
Mortgagor prior to the due date of the next such payment, constitute an event of default under this 
mortgage. At Mortgagee's option, Mortgagor will pay a "lata charge" not exceeding (bar per 
centum (4%) of any installment when pawl more than fifteen (15) days after the duo data thereof 
to cover the c^tm expense involved in handling delinquent payments, but such "lata charge" shall 
not be payable out of the proceeds of any sale made to satisfy the indebtedness secured hereby, 
unless such proceeds ore sufficient to discharge the entire indebtedness and all proper costs sad 
expeiiae* secured thereby. 
3. If the total of the payments made by the Mortgagor under (a) of paragraph 2 preceding shall exceed the 
amount o( payment* actually made by the Mortgagee for ground rents, taxes and saaessmeats, or msuranee premiums, 
at* the cane may be, men excess -hail he credited on subsequent payments to be made by the Mortgagor for such 
items, if, however, such montldy payments shall not be sufficient to pay such items when the name shall become 
due and payable, then the Mortgagor shall pay to the Mortgage* any amount ne*ea*ar> to make up the deficiency 
within thirty (30* da\a after written notice from the Mortgagee stating the amount of the deficiency, which notice 
mav be given by mail. If at any tune the Mortgagor shall tender to the Mortgagee, in accordance with the provsaons 
o( the note secured liereiiy, full payment of the entire indebtedness represented thereby, the Mortgagee shall, in 
computing the amount of *uch indebtedness, credit to the account of the Mortgagor any credit ^ « " * » accumulated 
under the proviMiomt of ia) of paragraph 2 hereof. If the-e shall he a default under any of the provuaona of this 
ruoritf&gc resulting in a public sale of the premises covered hereby, or if the Mortgages acquires the property otherwise 
u:ter default, the Mortgagee -hail apply, at the time of the commencement of such proceedings, or at the time the 
rtrtifjcrrv is otherwise acquired, the amount then remaining to the credit of Mortgagor under (a) of paragraph 2 
;;n*ceding. as a credit on tin* interest accrued and unpaid and the balance to the principal then remaining unpaid 
on said note. 
4 Hie ii-n of rhi« instrument • hnll remain m full force and effect during say postponement or extension of the 
•irne ..{ pa-. :u««nt of the mdcUt due* or any part thereof secured hereby. 
M,rz..iL'>r is l.-.w:*ull\ sized of -aui premises in fee simple (or such other estate as is stated herein), and has 
± «-t . . !•»• .i nisrir t » ruortmiKf «••{!. and ciiave\ the iame, and will warrant and defend the same against ail 
>:iutM' "Imu i^ .w l ut,:mfK.'-> what-w.cr. litis mortgage is a lien on said property. 
IT M I |»:»\ .*" :::*'iitid rent* ta.te*. u-wswrnenta. water rates, and other rovernmentai or municipal chance*. 
•* f in vud prvmi«--* except when pavment for all such items hs* theretofore been uuuic 
• ti 1 • ,.. 1 J . . ' .1 M>, Mill i . n u m . i l i il«*iivi«f> fl . . tiifuMul r iHfintj i f \\**mti%m •/» t h » \ f < .~«». . .~_ 
L532: ^ 1 6 3 
7. Mortgagor shall not commit or permit waste; sad shall ™«;w»«i«t the property ia a* good condition a* at 
preaeat, rraannshle wear aad tear excepted. Upon aay failure to so "•»*'•••, Mortgagee, ** xta option may eaass 
reasonable maintenance work to be performed at the cost ot Mortgagor. 
S. Mortgagor will continuously mainftiin hazard insurance, of such type or types and tawxmts a* Mortgagee 
may from time to time require, oa the improvements now or hereafter oo said premises, aad except when payment 
for all such premiums has theretofore been made under (a) of paragraph 2 hereof, he will pay promptly when due 
say premiums therefor. All insurance shall be carried ia companies approved by the Mortgagee aad the policies 
and renewals thereof shall be held by it and hare attached thereto loss payable dausea ia favor of aad ia form 
acceptable tc the Mortgagee. Ia eveat o( loss he will give immediate notice by mail to the Mortgagee, who may 
make proof of foes if not made promptly by the Mortgagor. Each insurance company ajuceraed is hereby authorised 
and directed to make payment for such loss directly to the Mortgagee instead of to the Mortgagor aad the Mortesauo-
joiatly. The ins. ranee proceeds, or aay part thereof, may be applied by the Mortgage*, at its option, either to the 
reduction of the indebtedness hereby secured or to the restoration or repair of the pruuerty <*«—«f* In event of 
foreclosure o( this mortgage, or other transfer of title to the mortgaged property in extiagusmmeat of the debt 
secured hereby, all right, title and interest of the Mortgagor ia aad to aay insurance policies then ia fores shall 
pass to the purchaser or grantee. 
9. Mortgagee may perform any defaulted covenant or agrimrnsnl of Mortgagor to smm extent so Mortgagee 
shall determine, and any moaeya advanced by Mortgagee for such purpose* shall bear interest at the rats pro-
vided for in the principal indebtedness, shall thereupon become a part of the mdebtedures second by tea* 
instrument, ratably and on a parity with all other indebtedness secured therebyr and aboil be payable thirty 
(30) days after demand. 
10. Upon the request of the Mortgagee, the Mortgagor anafl execute and defirer a supplier! sntei note or 
notes for the sum or sums advanced by the Mortgagee for the alteration, mpdarnissrion or improvement mods 
at the Mortgagor's request; or for maintenance of said premises or taxes or assessments against the same and 
for any other purpose elsewhere authorised hereunder. Said note or uttessbjUl be secured hereby on a parity 
with and as folly as if the advance evidenced thereby were included m the note first lisarrihiid abort, Said 
supplemental note or notes shall bear interest at the rate provided for in the principal musbtadneaa and shall 
bo payable in approximately equal monthly peymenta.far^«ch period an may be agreed anon by the creditor 
and debtor. Failing to agree on the maturity, the whole of the sum or sums so advanced snail be duo aad 
payable thirty (30) days after demand by the creditor. Ia no eront shall the maturity extend beyond too 
ultinaate maturity of the note first described above. 
11. Upon a default in the payment of any HirisriHtrni— hereby secured or m the performs nee of any of the 
terms or conditions hereof, the Mortgagee may dseasre the entire fnonbteesea* due aad faremlnss this mortgage 
aad may eater upon the property, eofleet all rente, besoms, aad prate thereof. 
12. If smt is brought to enforce the coOection of the debt secured hereby, the court may appoint a issaUsr of 
the mortgaged premises pending foreclosure aad redemption. 
IX Mortgagor will pay all costs, aad expenses, including rpssonshle attorneys fees, i asanashfr iaeurred by 
the Mortgagee, because of the failure on the part of the Mortgagor to perform his obligation under said ptnmissnry 
note and this mortgage, or either. 
14. If the indebtedness ssanred hereby be guaranteed or insured under the Servicemen's Readjustment Act, 
as amended, such Act and Regulations issued thereunder aad ia effect on the date hereof shall govern the rights, 
duties and liabilities of the parties hereto, and any provisions of this or other instruments executed in connection 
with said indebtedness which are inconsistent with said Act or Regulations are hereby amended to conform thereto. 
The covenants herein contained shall bind, aad the benefits sad advantages shall inure to, the respective heirs, 
executors, administrator*, sunausurs aad assigns of the parties hereto. Whenever used, the singular number shall 
include the plural, the plural the singular, the use of say gender shall include all genders, and the term "Mort-
gagee" shall include any payee of the indebtedness hereby secured or aay transferee thereof whether by operation 
of law or otherwise. 
WITNESS the hand and seal of the Mortgagor the day and year first above written. 
Signed in the presence of— : . U . ™ i - ^ ^ - . - W i . T . ^Jl 
aanrjoth Rigtrm* , 
152? ~d64 
STATE OF UTAH, 
COUNTY OF Salt U K « J 
On the 2T*i <**? °f July 
c=e .Ker.net.% ?. igtr-ip, an unnarr ied nan 
above instrument, who duly acknowledged to me thai he 
My commtaaon expirvs 
, A. D. 19 58 , peaon&Qy appeared before 
, the «cner(s) of tot 
executed the same. 
Salt Lake City. Utah 
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MHGlJttCCMJDCT SEND TO* PAID IN PILL 17-14-33 JC 
KENNETH OR SUSANNE RIGTRUP f W a M M C O t t O W f l O
 L - N # 003-3004480 _ ^ 
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SATBFACHOH OF MORTGAGE 
CIOW All . UBC BT rSESE ? J U M f f & TWt * » P l U C f H A L FBXBAL SAVORS AMD 
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KENhXT? RIGTRUP. *g "fwarr ,1111 Y *\t H'tt 
to PWDPTHAL I B B U L 
<**»*•• • • ! • 
July IS, 1958 
6^1 
JdJLUSi. 
'.ot 28 , EAST MILLCREEK SUBOIYISION, according to th* p l a t thereof , recorded 
n the o f f i c e of the County Recorer of said County. ^ 
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Section 13. [Judicial Conduct Commission J 
A Judicial Conduct Commission is established 
which shall investigate and conduct confidential 
hearings regarding complaints against any justice or 
judge. Following its investigations and hearings, the 
Judicial Conduct Commission may order the repri-
mand, censure, suspension, removal, or involuntary 
retirement of any justice or judge for the following: 
(1) action which constitutes willful misconduct in 
office; 
(2) final conviction of a crime punishable as a 
felony under state or federal law; 
(3) willful and persistent failure to perform 
judicial duties; 
(4) disability that seriously interferes with the per-
formance of judicial duties; or 
(5) conduct prejudicial to the administration of 
justice which brings a judicial office into disrepute. 
Prior to the implementation of any commission 
order, the supreme court shall review the commissi-
on's proceedings as to both law and fact. The court 
may also permit the introduction of additional 
evidence. After its review, the supreme court shall, 
as it finds just and proper, issue its order impleme-
nting, rejecting, or modifying the commission's 
order. The legislature by statute shall provide for 
the composition and procedures of the Judicial 
Conduct Commission. 
78*7-1, Disqualification for interest or relation to 
parties. 
Except by consent of all parties, no justice, judge 
or justice of the peace shall sit or act as such in any 
action or proceeding: 
(1) To which he is a party, or in which he is inte-
rested. 
(2) When he is related to either party by consan-
guinity or affinity within the third degree, computed 
according to the rules of the common law. 
(3) When he has been attorney or counsel for 
either party in the action or proceeding. 
But the provisions of this section shall not apply 
to the arrangement of the calendar or the regulation 
of the order of business, nor to the power of trans-
ferring the action or proceeding to some other 
court. 
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Rule 63. Disability or Disqualification of a Judge, 
(a) Disability If by reason of death, sickness, or other disability, a judge 
before whom an action has been tried is unable to perform the duties to be 
performed by the court under these rules after a verdict is returned or findings 
of fact and conclusions of law are filed, then any other judge regularly sitting 
in or assigned to the court in which the action was tried may perform those 
duties, but if such other judge is satisfied that he cannot perform those duties 
because he did not preside at the trial or for any other reason, he may in his 
discretion grant a new trial. 
(b) Disqualification. Whenever a party to any action or proceeding, civil or 
criminal, or his attorney shall make and file an affidavit that the judge before 
whom such action or proceeding is to be tried or heard has a bias or prejudice, 
either against such party or his attorney or in favor of any opposite party to 
the suit, such judge shall proceed no further therein, except to call in another 
judge to hear and determine the matter 
Every such affidavit shall state the facts and the reasons for the belief that 
such bias or prejudice exists, and shall be filed as soon as practicable after the 
case has been assigned or such bias or prejudice is known If the judge against 
whom the affidavit is directed questions the sufficiency of the affidavit, he shall 
enter an order directing that a copy thereof be forthwith certified to another 
judge (naming him) of the same court or of a court of like jurisdiction, which 
judge shall then pass upon the legal sufficiency of the affidavit If the judge 
against whom the affidavit is directed does not question the legal sufficiency 
of the affidavit, or if the judge to whom the affidavit is certified finds that it 
is legally sufficient, another judge must be called in to try the case or determine 
the matter in question. No party shall be entitled m any case to file more than 
one affidavit, and no such affidavit shall be filed unless accompanied by a 
certificate of counsel of record that such affidavit and application are made m 
good faith 
• ' i - : ; . 
Joseph J. Palmer (#250&)^ftdV** 
Reid E. Lewis (#1951), ^ * ^ 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-0250 
Attorneys for Prudential Federal Savings & 
Loan Association 
DCT2| Zup.'K 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY 
MADSEN, his wife, for them-
selves and all others simi-
larly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & 
LOAN ASSOCIATION, for itself 
and all others similarly 
situated, 
Defendant. 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN A. ADAMS 
Civil No. 226073 
("Madsen I") 
Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
) ss. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John A. Adams, being duly sworn, deposes and says: 
1. I am Senior Vice President of Prudential Federal 
Savings & Loan Association, the defendant in this action. 
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2. This action was tried by the Honorable Kenneth 
Rigtrup on September 4, 5 and 6, 1985. I was present in court 
each day of the trial. 
3. I was present in court on Friday, September 6, 
1985, when Judge Rigtrup, immediately after the close of the 
trial, made the remarks set forth in paragraph 12 of the 
Affidavit of Disqualification. 
4. The conversation described in paragraph 12 of the 
Affidavit of Disqualification, and in Exhibit No. 1 of the 
Affidavit, accurately reflects the statements made by Judge 
Rigtrup and by Joseph Palmer during the proceedings. 
5. Until I heard Judge Rigtrup's statements in court 
on September 6, 1985, I had never been told by anyone nor did I 
know that Judge Rigtrup had a mortgage with Prudential. 
6. I have access to the mortgage files maintained by 
Prudential. There are approximately in excess of 18,000 
mortgages now held by Prudential. 
7. After hearing Judge Rigtrupfs comments, I 
researched the Prudential records and found the mortgage file 
for him. The mortgage instrument between Judge Rigtrup and 
Prudential was originally executed on July 3, 1958. rt 
required Judge Rigtrup to pay funds each month into a reserve 
account. The underlying loan was completely paid by Judge 
Rigtrup on approximately December 14, 1983. 
DATED this 1*1 V day of October, 1985. 
/udhn A. Adams 
-2-
,'•;• M ..'"On this day of October, 1985, personally . 
.  appearedIpefore me John A. Adams, the signer of the Affidavit 
/, who d,uly\ acknowledged to me that he executed it. 
My'^Gominission Expires: 
Residing in: ^ f ^ j ^ (fly ^ ^ 
-3-
Salt Lak® City, ytarv 
JAN 16 1986 
H. Dixon Hi 
IN THE THIRD J l f t f tm r 
rn.e»wciCTK;soFnc8 
DEC 26 4 3a PH '95 list. Court 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD MADSEN and NANCY MADSEN, his ) 
wife, for themselves and all others 
similarly situated, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL SAVINGS & LOAN 
ASSOCIATION, for itself and all 
others similarly situated, 
Defendant. 
UTAH BANKERS ASSOCIATION 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN T. HARD 
Civil No 226073 
Stephen T. Hard, being first duly sworn upon oath, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am an associate attorney in the law firm of 
Giauq-ue & Williams. 
2. From approximately December, 1980 to July, 1983, 
Richard W. Giauque and I were counsel of record for Western 
Savings & Loan Company in the matters of Everill v. Western 
Savings & Loan Company, Civil No. 79-701, ("Everill") and Petty 
v. Western Savings & Loan Company, Civil No. 79-700 ("Petty"). 
3. A number of the "interest-on-reserve account" 
cases, including the Everill and Petty cases, were consolidated 
before the Honorable Kenneth Rigtrup. 
Exhibit. CT 
4. I recall that at some point in the proceedings 
over which he presided, Judge Rigtrup indicated that he had an 
old, low-interest mortgage loan which contained a reserve 
account clause. He further indicated that he would be able to 
rule objectively in these matters despite that fact, I recall 
that he asked if anyone had any objections to his sitting on 
these cases. I do not recollect anyone so objecting. 
DATED this StCrfJ) day of December, 1985. 
t^fepiren T. Hard 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
On this £>o^ day of December, 1985, personally appeared 
before me Stephen T. Hard, the signer of the foregoing 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same, 
My Commission Expires: 
O 0* 
0586p 
"TCgSegwz^ g-oe^ O 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: ?&£., SSZ^OLJ'. 
-2-
CERTIFICATE OF MAffcfNfi 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
AFFIDAVIT OF STEPHEN T. HARD (Madsen vs. Prudential Utah Bankers Association) 
was MAILED, U.S. MAIL, .pQ5"fragG pi'tpaid, this **t? day of />>. t— , 
1985, to the following: 
Joseph J. Palmer, Esq. 
Reid E. Lewis 
MOYLE & DRAPER, P.C. 
600 Deseret Plaza 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Peter W. Billings 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 
Approved by the Supreme Court of Utahf March 1, 1974 
CANON 1 
A Judge Should Uphold 
the Integrity and 
Independence of the Judiciary 
An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice 
in our society. A judge should participate in establishing, maintaining, 
and enforcing, and should himself observe, high standards of conduct 
so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. 
The provisions of this Code should be construed and applied to further 
that objective. 
CANON 2 
A Judge Should Avoid 
Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All His Activities 
A. A judge should respect and comply with the law and should conduct 
himself at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in 
the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. 
B. A judge should not allow his family, social, or other relationships to 
influence his judicial conduct or judgment. He should not lend the 
prestige of his office to advance the private interests of others; nor 
should he convey or permit others to convey the impression that they 
are in a special position to influence him. He should not testify 
voluntarily as a character witness. 
CANON 3 
A Judge Should Perform 
the Duties of His Office Impartially 
and Diligently 
The judicial duties of a judge take precedence over all his other 
activities. His judicial duties include all the duties of his office prescribed 
by law. In the performance of these duties, the following standards apply: 
A. Adjudicative Responsibilities. 
(1) A judge should be faithful to the law and maintain professional 
competence in it. He should be unswayed by partisan interests, 
public clamor, or fear of criticism. 
(2) A judge should maintain order and decorum in proceedings before 
him. 
(3) A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants, 
jurors, witnesses, lawyers, and others with whom he deals in his 
official capacity, and should require similar conduct of lawyers, 
and of his staff, court officials, and others subject to his direction 
and control. 
(4) A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested 
in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to 
law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider 
ex parte or other communications concerning a pending or impending 
proceeding. A judge, however, may obtain the advice of a dis-
interested expert on the law applicable to a proceeding before him 
if he gives notice to the parties of the person consulted and the 
substance of the advice, and affords the parties reasonable oppor-
tunity to respond. 
(5) A judge should dispose promptly of the business of the court. 
(6) A judge should abstain from public comment about a pending or 
impending proceeding in any court, and should require similar 
abstention on the part of court personnel subject to his direction 
and control. This subsection does not prohibit judges from making 
public statements in the course of their official duties or from 
explaining for public information the procedures of the court. 
(7) A judge should prohibit broadcasting, televising, recording, or taking 
photographs in the courtroom and areas immediately adjacent thereto 
during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that 
a judge may authorize: 
(a) the use of electronic or photographic means for the presentation 
of evidence, for the perpetuation of a record, or for other purposes 
of judicial administration; 
(b) the broadcasting, televising, recording, or photographing of inves-
titive, ceremonial, or naturalization proceedings; 
(c) the photographic or electronic recording and reproduction of 
appropriate court proceedings. 
B. Administrative Responsibilities 
(1) A judge should diligently discharge his administrative responsibili-
ties, maintain professional competence in judicial administration, and 
facilitate the performance of the administrative responsibilites of 
other judges and court officials. 
(2) A judge should require his staff and court officials subject to his 
direction and control to observe the standards of fidelity and dili-
gence that apply to him. 
(3) A judge should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures 
against a judge or lawyer for unprofessional conduct of which the 
judge may become aware. 
(4) A judge should not make unnecessary appointments. He should 
exercise his power of appointment only on the basis of merit, avoid-
ing nepotism and favoritism. He should not approve compensation 
of appointees beyond the fair value of services rendered. 
C. Disqualification. ^ ^ ^ ^ 
(1) A judge shmiiri(ftisq^fl|ifY jn'nnsjpTf)iTi a proceeding in which his 
impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
(a) he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal 
knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceed-
ing; 
(b) he served as lawyer in the matter in controversy, or a lawyer with 
whom he previously practiced law served during such association 
as a lawyer concerning the matter, or the judge or such lawyer 
has been a material witness concerning it; 
(c) he knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary, or his spouse or 
minor child residing in his household, has a financial interest 
in the subject matter in controversy or in a pajrty to the proceed-
ing, or any other interest that could bergubsteiffiaiiy arfetrtet^--
by the outcome of the proceeding; ~~^ 
(d) he or his spouse, or a person within the third degree of relation-
ship to either of them, or the spouse of such a person; 
(i) is a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, or trustee 
of a party; 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an interest that could be sub-
stantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding; 
(iv) is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in 
the proceeding; 
(2) A judge should inform himself about his personal and fiduciary 
financial interests, and make a reasonable effort to inform himself 
about the personal financial interests of his spouse and minor chil-
dren residing in his household. 
(3) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) the degree of relationship is calculated according to the civil law 
system; 
(b) "fiduciary" includes such relationships as executor, administrator, 
trustee, and guardian; 
(c) "financial interegiii-aieans ownership of a legal or equitable in-
terest, ^ ^ g ^ ^ ^ ^ v or a relationship as director, advisor, or 
other aoiVGrparncipant in the affairs of a party, except that: 
(i) ownership in a mutual or common investment fund that 
holds securities is not a "financial interest" in such securities 
unless the judge participates in the management of the fund; 
(ii) an office in an educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, 
or civic organization is not a "financial interest" in securities 
held by the organization; 
(iii) the proprietary interest of a policy holder in a mutual in-
surance company, of a depositor in a mutual savings associa-
tion, or a similar proprietary interest, is a "financial interest" 
in the organization only if the outcome of the proceeding 
could substantially affect the value of the interest; 
(iv) ownership of government securities is a "financial interest" 
in the issuer only if the outcome of the proceeding could 
substantially affect the value of the securities. 
D. Remittal of Disqualification. 
A judge may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding, disclose 
on the record the basis of his disrmaiifiVaHrm Tf KQC^ ^« ™~u ^~ 
closure, the parties and lawyers, independently of the judge's participa-
tion, all agree that the judge's relationship is immaterial or that his 
financial "interest is insubstantial, the judge is no longer disqualified, 
and may participate in the proceeding. 
CANON 4 
A Judge May Engage in 
Activities to Improve the Law, 
the Legal System, and 
the Administration of Justice 
A judge, subject to the proper performance of his judicial duties, may 
engage in the following quasi-judicial activities, if in doing so he does not 
cast doubt on his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come 
before him: 
A. He may speak, write, lecture, teach, and participate in other activities 
concerning the law, the legal system, and the administration of justice. 
B. He may appear at a public hearing before an executive or legislative 
body or official on matters concerning the law, the legal system, and 
the administration of justice, and he may otherwise consult with an 
executive or legislative body or official, but only on matters concerning 
the administration of justice. 
C. He may serve as a member, officer, or director of an organization or 
governmental agency devoted to the improvement of the law, the legal 
system, or the administration of justice. He may assist such an organi-
zation in raising funds and may participate in their management and 
investment, but should not personally participate in public fund raising 
activities. He may make recommendations to public and private fund-
granting agencies on projects and programs concerning the law, the 
legal system, and the administration of justice. 
CANON 5 
A Judge Should Regulate 
His Extra-Judicial Activities 
to Minimize the Risk of 
Conflict with His Judicial Duties 
A. Avocational Activities. A judge may write, lecture, teach, and speak 
on non-legal subjects, and engage in the arts, sports, and other social 
and recreational activities, if such avocational activities do not detract 
from the dignity of his office or interfere with the performance of his 
judicial duties. 
B. Civic and Charitable Activities. A judge may participate in civic and 
charitable activities that do not reflect adversely upon his impartiality 
or interfere with the performance of his judicial duties. A judge may 
serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of an educa-
tional, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization not conducted 
for the economic or political advantage of its members, subject to the 
following limitations: 
(1) A judge should not serve if it is likely that the organization will be 
engaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him or 
will be regularly engaged in adversary proceedings in any court. 
(2) A judge should not solicit funds for any educational, religious, 
charitable, fraternal, or civic organization, or use or permit the use 
of the prestige of his office for that purpose, but he may be listed 
as an officer, director, or trustee of such an organization. He should 
not be a speaker or the guest of honor at an organization's fund rais-
ing events, but he may attend such events. 
(3) A judge should not give investment advice to such an organization, 
but he may serve on its board of directors or trustees even though it 
has the responsibility for approving investment decisions. 
C. Financial Activities. 
(1) A judge should refrain from financial and business dealings that 
tend to reflect adversely on his impartiality, interfere with the 
proper performance of his judicial duties, exploit his judicial posi-
tion, or involve him in frequent transactions with lawyers or persons 
likely to come before the court on which he serves. 
(2) Subject to the requirements of subsection (1), a judge may hold 
and manage investments, including real estate, and engage in other 
remunerative activity. 
(3) A judge should manage his investments and other financial interests 
to minimize the number of cases in which he is disqualified. As soon 
as he can do so without serious financial detriment, he should divest 
himself of investments and other financial interests that might re-
quire frequent disqualification. 
(4) Neither a judge nor a member of his family residing in his household 
should accept a gift, bequest, favor, or loan from anyone except as 
follows: 
(a) a judge may accept a gift incident to a public testimonial to him; 
books supplied by publishers on a complimentary basis for official 
use; or an invitation to the judge and his spouse to attend a bar-
related function or activity devoted to the improvement of the 
law, the legal system, or the administration of justice; 
(b) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may 
accept ordinary social hospitality; a gift, bequest, favor, or loan 
from a relative; a wedding or engagement gift; a loan from a 
lending institution in its regular course of business on the same 
terms generally available to persons who are not judges; or a 
scholarship or fellowship awarded on the same terms applied to 
other applicants; 
(c) a judge or a member of his family residing in his household may 
accept any other gift, bequest, favor, or loan only if the donor 
is not a party or other person whose interests have come or are 
likely to come before him. 
(5) For the purposes of this section "member of his family residing in 
his household" means any relative of a judge by blood or marriage, 
or a person treated by a judge as a member of his family, who resides 
in his hnm^hfilri 
(6) Information acquired by a judge in his judicial capacity should not 
be used or disclosed by him in financial dealings or for any other 
purpose not related to his judicial duties. 
D. Fiduciary Activities. A judge should not serve as the executor, adminis-
trator, trustee, guardian, or other fiduciary, except for the estate, trust, 
or person of a member of his family, and then only if such service will 
not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties. "Mem-
ber of his family'' includes a spouse, child, grandchild, parent, grand-
parent, or other relative or person with whom the judge maintains a 
close familial relationship. As a family fiduciary a judge is subject to 
the following restrictions: 
(1) He should not serve if it is likely that as a fiduciary he will be en-
gaged in proceedings that would ordinarily come before him, or if 
the estate, trust, or ward becomes involved in adversary proceedings 
in the court on which he serves or one under its appellate jurisdic-
tion. 
(2) While acting as a fiduciary a judge is subject to the same restrictions 
on financial activities that apply to him in his personal capacity. 
E. Practice of Law. A judge should not practice law. 
F. Extra-judicial Appointments. A judge should not accept appointment to 
a governmental committee, commission, or other position that is con-
cerned with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improve-
ment of the law, the legal system, or the administration of justice. A 
judge, however, may represent his country, state, or locality on cere-
monial occasions or in connection with historical, educational, and cul-
tural activities. 
CANON 6 
Compensation Received for Quasi-Judicial 
and Extra-Judicial Activities 
A judge may receive compensation and reimbursement of expenses for 
the quasi-judicial and extra-judicial activities permitted by this Code, if the 
source of such payments does not give the appearance of influencing the 
judge in his judicial duties or otherwise give the appearance of impropriety, 
subject to the following restrictions: 
A. Compensation. Compensation should not exceed a reasonable amount nor 
should it exceed what a person who is not a judge would receive for the 
same activity. 
B. Expense Reimbursement. Expense reimbursement should be limited to 
the actual cost of travel, food, and lodging reasonably incurred by the 
judge and, where appropriate to the occasion, by his spouse. Any payment 
in excess of such an amount is compensation. 
CANON 7 
A Judge Should Refrain from 
Political Activity Inappropriate 
to His Judicial Office 
A. Political Conduct in General. 
(1) A judge or a candidate for election to judicial office should not: 
(a) act as a leader or hold any office in a political organization; 
(b) make speeches for a political organization or candidate or publicly 
endorse a candidate for public office; 
(c) solicit funds for or pay an assessment or make a contribution to a 
political organization or candidate, attend political gatherings, or 
purchase tickets for political party dinners, or other functions, 
except as authorized in subsection A(2); 
(2) A judge holding an office filled by public election between competing 
candidates, or a candidate for such office, may, only insofar as per-
mitted by law, attend political gatherings, speak to such gatherings on 
Jiis own behalf when he is a candidate for election or re-election, 
identify himself as a member of a political party, and contribute to 
a political party or organization. 
(3) A judge should resign his office when he becomes a candidate either 
in a party primary or in a general election for a non-judicial office, 
except that he may continue to hold his judicial office while being a 
candidate for election to or serving as a delegate in a state constitu-
tional convention, if he is otherwise permitted by law to do so. 
(4) A judge should not engage in any other political activity except on 
behalf of measures to improve the law, the legal system, or the 
administration of justice. 
B. Campaign Conduct. 
(1) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that 
is filled either by public election between competing candidates or on 
the basis of a merit system election: 
(a) should maintain the dignity appropriate to judicial office, and 
should encourage members of his family to adhere to the same 
standards of political conduct that apply to him; 
(b) should prohibit public officials or employees subject to his direc-
tion or control from doing for him what he is prohibited from 
doing under this Canon; and except to the extent authorized 
under subsection B(2) or B{3), he should not allow any other 
person to do for him what he is prohibited from doing under 
this Canon; 
(c) should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office other 
than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of the 
office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues; 
or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or 
other fact. 
(2) A candidate, including an incumbent judge, for a judicial office that 
is filled by public election between competing candidates should not 
himself solicit or accept campaign funds, or solicit publicly stated 
support, but he may establish committees of responsible persons to 
secure and manage the expenditure of funds for his campaign and 
to obtain public statements of support for his candidacy. Such com-
mittees are not prohibited from soliciting campaign contributions 
and public support from lawyers. A candidate's committees may 
solicit funds for his campaign no earlier than [90] days before a pri-
mary election and no later than [90] days after the last election in 
which he participates during the election year. A candidate should 
not use or permit the use of campaign contributions for the private 
henefit of himself or members of his family. 
(3) An incumbent judge who is a candidate for retention in or re-election 
to office without a competing candidate, and whose candidacy has 
drawn active opposition, may campaign in response thereto and may 
obtain publicly stated support and campaign funds in the manner 
provided in subsection B(2). 
1580 106 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 
AETNA LIFE INSURANCE 
CO., Appellant 
v. 
Margaret W, LAVOIE and Roger 
J. Lavoie, Sr» 
No. 84-1601. 
April 22, 1986. 
Action was brought charging health 
insurer with bad faith refusal to pay claimo 
After two remands, 374 So.2d 310, 405 
So.2d 17, the Circuit Court, Mobile County, 
Michael E. Zoghby, J., rendered judgment 
on jury verdict for insured for compensato-
ry and punitive damages, and insurer ap-
pealed. The Alabama Supreme Court, 410 
So 2d 1060, affirmed, and insurer appealed. 
The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Burger, 
held that (1) Court had jurisdiction; (2) 
Alabama Supreme Court Justice's general 
frustration with insurance companies that 
were dilatory in paying claims did not re-
veal bias requiring disqualification under 
due process clause; (3) Justice's partic-
ipation in case violated insurer's due pro-
cess rights; (4) there was no basis for 
concluding that other Justices were dis-
qualified; and (5) appearance of justice 
would be best served by vacating decision 
and remanding for further proceedings. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Justice Brennan filed concurring opin-
ion. 
Justice Blackmun filed opinion concur-
ring in judgment in which Justice Marshall 
joined. 
Justice Stevens did not participate. 
1. Federal Courts <*»504 
Supreme Court had jurisdiction over 
question of whether Alabama Supreme 
Court Justice's participation in case violat-
ed insurer's rights under due process 
clause of Fourteenth Amendment [U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14], where Alabama Su-
preme Court's order denying recusal mo-
tions clearly demonstrated court reached 
merits of insurer's constitutional challenge, 
and insurer raised this issue as soon as it 
discovered facts relating to Justice's state 
actions against insurance companies alleg-
ing bad-faith failure to pay claims. 
2. Judges <s»49U) 
Only in most extreme cases of bias or 
prejudice is disqualification of judge consti-
tutionally required. 
3. Constitutional Law e=»316 
Alabama Supreme Court Justice's gen-
eral frustration with insurance companies 
that were dilatory in paying claims did not 
reveal bias requiring disqualification under 
due process clause [U.S.CoA. ConstAmend. 
14]. 
4. Constitutional Law <s»316 
Insurer's rights under due process 
clause of Fourteenth Amendment [HS.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14] were violated by Jus-
tice's participation in action seeking puni-
tive damages for insurer's alleged bad-faith 
refusal to pay valid claim, where Justice, at 
time he cast deciding vote and authored 
court's opinion, had pending at least one 
very similar bad faith refusal-to-pay law-
suit against an insurer in another state 
court 
5. Judges <&»42 
While Alabama Supreme Court Jus-
tices might conceivably have had slight pe-
cuniary interest in action against insurer 
seeking punitive damages for bad-faith re-
fusal to pay valid claim because of their 
possible inclusion in other Justices' class 
action against another insurer alleging bad 
faith, that interest was not direct, personal, 
substantial and pecuniary, as required to 
disqualify such judges. 
6. Federal Courts <s»513 
Upon determining that Alabama Su-
preme Court Justice was disqualified from 
participation in case, appearance of justice 
would be best served by vacating decision 
and remanding for further proceedings, 
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where Justice cast deciding vote and au-
thored court's opinion. 
Theodore B. Olson, Washington, D.C., 
for appellant 
Jack N. Goodman, Washington, D.C., for 
appellees. 
Syllabus * 
When appellant insurer refused to pay 
the full amount of a hospital bill incurred 
by appellees, they brought suit in an Ala-
bama state court, seeking both payment of 
the full amount and punitive damages for 
appellant's alleged bad-faith refusal to pay 
a valid claim. The jury awarded $3.5 mil-
lion in punitive damages. The Alabama 
Supreme Court affirmed, 5-to-4, in a per 
curiam opinion written by Justice Embry. 
Appellant then filed an application for re-
hearing, and, before the application was 
acted on, learned that while the case was 
pending before the Alabama Supreme 
Court, Justice Embry had filed two actions 
in an Alabama court against insurance 
companies alleging bad-faith failure to pay 
claims and seeking punitive damages. One 
of the actions was a class action on behalf 
of all state employees insured under a 
group plan by the Blue Cross-Blue Shield. 
Appellant then filed motions challenging, 
on due process grounds, Justice Embry's 
participation in the per curiam decision 
and his continued participation in consider-
ing the rehearing application, and also 
alleging that all justices on the court 
should recuse themselves because of their 
interests as potential class members in the 
Blue Cross suit The court denied these 
motions, and also the rehearing application. 
Subsequently, the Blue Cross suit was set-
tled, and Justice Embry received $30,000 
under that settlement 
Held: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
question whether Justice Embry's partie-
* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Re-
porter of Decisions for the convenience of the 
ipation in this case violated appellant's 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, where the Ala-
bama Supreme Court's order denying the 
recusal motions clearly demonstrated that 
the court reached the merits of appellant's 
constitutional challenge, and where appel-
lant raised this issue as soon as it discover-
ed the facts relating to Justice Embry's 
personal lawsuits. P. 1584. 
2. Appellant's allegations, on a gener-
al basis, of Justice Embry's bias and preju-
dice against insurance companies that were 
dilatory in paying claims, were insufficient 
to establish any constitutional violation. 
Pp. 1584-1585. 
3. The record, however, presents 
more than mere allegations of bias and 
prejudice, and supports the conclusion that 
Justice Embry's participation in this case 
violated appellant's due process rights. All 
of the issues in this case were present in 
his Blue Cross suit, and the very nature of 
that suit placed in issue whether he would 
have to establish that he was entitled to a 
directed verdict on the underlying claims 
that Blue Cross refused to pay before gain-
ing punitive damages. Moreover, the af-
firmance in this case of the largest punitive 
damages award ever issued in Alabama on 
precisely the type of claim raised in the 
Blue Cross suit "raised the stakes" for 
Blue Cross in that suit to Justice Embry's 
benefit Thus, his opinion for the Alabama 
Supreme Court had the clear and immedi-
ate effect of enhancing both the legal sta-
tus and the settlement value of his own 
case. When he made the judgment in this 
case, he acted as "a judge in his own case." 
His interest in this case was "direct per-
sonal, substantial, [and] pecuniary," Ward 
v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S: 57, 60, 
93 S.Ct 80, 83, 34 LEd.2d 267 (1972), as 
shown by the sum he received in settlement 
of the Blue Cross suit Pp. 1585-1587. 
4. There is no bask for concluding 
that the justices of the Alabama Supreme 
reader. Set United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 
200 U.S. 321, 337. 26 S.O. 282. 287, 50 LEd. 
499. 
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Court other than Justice Embry were dis-
qualified under the Due Process Clause. 
While those justices might conceivably 
have had a slight pecuniary interest in this 
case because of their possible inclusion in 
the Blue Cross class action, that interest 
annot properly be characterized as "direct, 
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary." 
iny interest that they might have had 
vhen they passed on the rehearing applica-
ion was highly speculative and contingent, 
>ince at that time the trial court in the Blue 
>08s suit had not even certified a class, let 
alone awarded any class relief of a pecuni-
ary nature. Pp. 1587-1588. 
5. Because of Justice Embry's lead-
ing role in the decision under review, the 
"appearance of justice" will best be served 
by vacating the decision and remanding for 
further proceedings. Pp. 1588-1589. 
470 So.2d 1060 (Ala.1984), vacated and 
remanded. 
BURGER, CJ., delivered the opinion 
of the Court, in which BRENNAN, 
WHITE, POWELL, REHNQUIST, and 
O'CONNOR, JJ.f joined. BRENNAN, J., 
filed a concurring opinion. BLACKMUN, 
J., filed an opinion concurring in the judg-
ment, in which MARSHALL, J., joined. 
STEVENS, J.y took no part in the consider-
ation or decision of the case. 
Chief Justice BURGER delivered the 
opinion of the Court 
The question presented is whether the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was violated when a justice of 
the Alabama Supreme Court declined to 
recuse himself from participation in that 
court's consideration of this case. 
I 
This appeal arises out of litigation con-
cerning an insurance policy issued by ap-
pellant covering appellees Margaret and 
Roger Lavoie. In January 1977, Mrs. La-
voie was examined by her physician, Dr. 
Douglas, because of various ailments. 
Shortly thereafter, on Dr. Douglas' recom-
mendation, she was admitted to the Mobile 
Infirmary Hospital, where she remained 
for 23 days for a battery of tests. 
After her discharge, the hospital for-
warded the appropriate forms and medical 
records along with a bill for $3,028.25 to 
appellant's local office in Mobile, Alabama. 
The local office refused to pay the entire 
amount, tendering payment for only 
$1,650.22. The local office also sent a let-
ter to the national office, concluding that 
the 23-day hospitalization was unnecessary 
and that "[h]ospital records do not indicate 
anything to the contrary," even though all 
the hospital records had not yet been re-
ceived. At one point, the national office 
told the local office to continue denying the 
request for full payment, but added that 
"if they act like they are going to file suit," 
the file should be reviewed. 
Appellees filed suit against appellant, 
seeking both payment of the remainder of 
their original claim and punitive damages 
for the tort of bad faith refusal to pay a 
valid claim. The trial court dismissed for 
failure to state a cause of action .with re-
spect to the bad faith counts. Appellees 
appealed to the Alabama Supreme Court, 
which remanded on the ground that it had 
"not foreclosed the possibility of recovery 
in tort for the bad faith refusal of an 
insurer to pay legitimate benefits due un-
der an insurance policy." Lavoie v. Aetna 
Life & Casualty Co., 374 So.2d 310, 312 
(1979). On remand, the trial court entered 
judgment for appellees on the unpaid por-
tion of their claim and granted summary 
judgment for appellant on the bad faith 
claim. The Alabama Supreme Court again 
reversed, explaining that on that same day 
it had "recognized the intentional tort of 
bad faith in first party insurance-actions." 
Lavoie v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 405 
So.2d 17, 18 (1981) (citing Chavers v. Na-
tional Security Fire & Casualty Co., 405 
So.2d 1 (Ala.1981)). On remand, appellees' 
bad faith claim was submitted to a jury. 
The jury awarded $3.5 million in punitive 
damages. The trial judge denied appel-
lant s motion for judgment n.o.v. or, alter-
natively, for remittitur. 
AETNA LIFE INS. 
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The Alabama Supreme Court affirmed 
the award in a 5-to-4 decision. 470 So.2d 
1060 (1984). An unsigned per curiam 
opinion expressed the view of five justices 
that the evidence demonstrated that appel-
lant had acted in bad faith. The court 
interpreted its prior opinions as not requir-
ing dismissal of a bad-faith-refusal-to-pay 
claim even where a directed verdict against 
the insurer on the underlying claim was 
impossible. The opinion also clarified the 
issue of whether a bad faith suit could be 
maintained where the insurer had made a 
partial payment of the underlying claim. 
Although earlier opinions of the court had 
refused to allow bad faith suits in such 
circumstances, partial payment was not dis-
positive of the bad faith issue. The court 
also rejected appellant's argument that the 
punitive damages award was so excessive 
that it must be set aside. 
Chief Justice Torbert, joined by Justice 
Beatty, dissented; Justice Maddox, joined 
by Justice Shores, also dissented, conclud-
ing that the case was controlled by the 
court's earlier decision in National Sav-
ings Life Ins. Co. v. Dutton, 419 So.2d 
1357 (1982), because there was an arguable 
reason for appellant's refusal to pay the 
claim. 
The court's opinion was released on De-
cember 7, 1984; on December 21, 1984, 
appellant filed a timely application for re-
hearing. On February 14, 1985, before its 
application had been acted on, appellant 
learned that while the instant action was 
pending before the Alabama Supreme 
Court, Justice Embry, one of the five jus-
tices joining the per curiam opinion, had 
filed two actions in the Circuit Court for 
Jefferson County, Alabama, against insur-
ance companies. Both of these actions al-
leged bad faith failure to pay a claim. One 
suit arose out of Maryland Casualty Com-
pany's alleged failure to pay for the loss of 
a valuable mink coat; the other suit, which 
Justice Embry brought on behalf of him-
self and as a representative of a class of all 
other Alabama state employees insured un-
der a group plan by Blue Cross-Blue Shield 
CO. v. LAVOIE 1 5 8 3 
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of Alabama (including, apparently, all jus-
tices of the Alabama Supreme Court), al-
leged willful and intentional failure to with-
hold payment on valid claims. Both suits 
sought punitive damages. 
On February 21,1985, appellant filed two 
motions in the Alabama Supreme Court, 
challenging Justice Embry's participation 
in the court's December 7, 1984, decision 
and his continued participation in consider-
ing appellant's application for rehearing. 
The motion also alleged that all justices on 
the court should recuse themselves because 
of their interests as potential class mem-
bers in Justice Embry's suit against Blue 
Cross. On March 8, 1985, the court unani-
mously denied the recusal motions. The 
brief order stated that each justice had 
voted individually on the matter of whether 
he should recuse himself and that each 
justice had voted not to do so. At the same 
time, by a 5-to-4 division, the court denied 
appellant's motion for rehearing. 
Chief Justice Torbert wrote separately, 
explaining that although his views had not 
been influenced by his possible membership 
in the putative class alleged in Justice Em-
bry's suit against Blue Cross, he was none-
theless notifying the Clerk of the court 
where that suit was pending not to permit 
him to be included in the alleged class. 
Justice Maddox also wrote separately, tak-
ing similar action. 
On March 20, 1985, appellant obtained a 
copy of the transcript of Justice Embry's 
deposition, taken on January 10, 1985, in 
connection with his Blue Cross suit The 
deposition revealed that Justice Embry had 
authored the per curiam opinion in this 
case over an 8- or 9-month period during 
which his civil action against Blue Cross 
was being prosecuted. Justice Embry also 
stated that, during that period, he had re-
ceived "leads" from people with regard to 
his bad faith action against Blue Cross and 
that he put them in touch with his attorney. 
Finally, Justice Embry revealed frustration 
with insurance companies. For example, 
when asked if he had ever had any difficul-
ty with processing claims, Justice Embry 
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retorted: "[T]hat is a silly question. For 
years and years." 
Appellant moved for leave to file a sec-
ond application for rehearing based on the 
deposition, but that motion was denied. 
Appellant filed an appeal with this Court, 
and Justice POWELL, as Circuit Justice, 
granted appellant's application for a stay 
of the judgment below pending this Court's 
disposition of the appeal. Shortly there-
after, Justice Embry's suit against Blue 
Cross was settled by stipulation of the par-
ties.1 In the stipulation, Blue Cross recog-
nized "that some problems have occurred 
in the past and is determined to minimize 
them in the future." Justice Embry re-
ceived $30,000 under the settlement agree-
ment on a basic compensatory claim of 
unspecified amount; a check for that sum 
was deposited by his attorney directly into 
Justice Embry's personal account. 
We postponed consideration of the ques-
tion of jurisdiction pending argument on 
the merits. 471 U.S. , 105 S.Ct. 2672, 
86 LEd.2d 691 (1985). We now vacate and 
remand. 
II 
[1] We are satisfied as to the Court's 
jurisdiction over the question of whether 
Justice Embry's participation violated ap-
pellant's Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess rights. Appellees argue that the Ala-
bama Supreme Court did not reach this 
issue because it was raised only after the 
court's decision on the merits. We reject 
that contention as at odds with the record. 
On March 8, 1985, the court entered the 
following order: 
"Upon consideration, the Court is of 
the opinion that under the allegation of 
said motion in this case each justice 
should vote individually on the matter of 
whether or not he or she is disqualified 
and should recuse Each justice having 
voted not to recuse, 
"IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED 
that the 'Motion for Disqualification and 
Motion for Withdrawal of Opinion of De-
cember 7, 1984, and for Hearing De 
Novo' be . . . denied." App. to Juris. 
Statement 64a. 
This order clearly demonstrates that the 
Alabama court reached the merits of appel-
lant's constitutional challenge, albeit on a 
justice-by-justice basis. Moreover, appel-
lant raised this issue as soon as it discover-
ed the facts relating to Justice Embry's 
personal lawsuits. On this record, we con-
clude jurisdiction is proper. See Ulster 
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 147-
154, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2219-2223, 60 L.Ed.2d 
777 (1979); Ward v. Village of Monroe-
mile, 409 U.S. 57, 61, 93 S.Ct. 80, 83, 34 
L.Ed.2d 267 (1972). 
Ill 
A 
Appellant contends Justice Embry's gen-
eral hostility towards insurance companies 
that were dilatory in paying claims, as ex-
pressed in his deposition, requires a conclu-
sion that the Due Process Clause was vio-
lated by his participation in the disposition 
of this case. The Court has recognized 
that not "[a]ll questions of judicial qualifi-
cation . . . involve constitutional validity. 
Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, 
state policy, remoteness of interest, would 
seem generally to be matters merely of 
legislative discretion." Tumey v. Ohio, 
273 U.S. 510, 523, 47 S.Ct 437, 441, 71 
L.Ed. 749 (1927); see also FTC v. Cement 
Institute, 333 U.S. 683, 702, 68 S.Ct 793, 
804, 92 L.E& 1010 (1948) ("most matters 
relating to judicial disqualification [do] not 
rise to a constitutional level"). Moreover, 
the traditional common-law rule was that 
disqualification for bias or prejudice was 
not permitted. See, e.g., Clyma v. Kenne-
dy, 64 Conn. 310, 29 A. 539 (1894). See 
generally Frank, Disqualification of 
Judges, 56 Yale LJ. 605 (1947). As Black-
1. Justice Embry's suit against Maryland Casual-
ty Comoaiw had been settled sometime earlier 
by the payment of Justice Embry's claim. 
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stone put it, "the law will not suppose a 
possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who 
is already sworn to administer impartial 
justice, and whose authority greatly de-
pends upon that presumption and idea/' 3 
W. Blackstone, Commentaries *361. The 
more recent trend has been towards the 
adoption of statutes that permit disqualifi-
cation for bias or prejudice. See Berger v. 
United States, 255 U.S. 22, 31, 41 S.Ct 
230, 232, 65 LEd. 481 (1921) (enforcing 
statute disqualifying federal judges in cer-
tain circumstances for personal bias or 
prejudice). See also ABA Code of Judicial 
Conduct, Canon 3CUXa) (1980) ("[A] judge 
should disqualify himself . . . where he has 
a personal bias or prejudice concerning a 
party"). But that aione would not be suffi-
cient basis for imposing a constitutional 
requirement under the Due Process Clause. 
We held in Patterson v. New York, <32 
U.S. 197, 201-202, 97 S.Ct 2319, 2322-2323, 
53 LEd.2d 281 (1977) (citations omitted), 
that 
"it is normally within the power of the 
State to regulate procedures under which 
its laws are carried out . . . and its deci-
sion in this regard is not subject to pro-
scription under the Due Process Clause 
unless it offends some principle of justice 
so rooted in the traditions and conscience 
of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental." 
[2,3] We need not decide whether alle-
gations of bias or prejudice by a judge of 
the type we have here would ever be suffi-
cient under the Due Process Clause to 
force recusal. Certainly only in the most 
extreme of cases would disqualification on 
this basis be constitutionally required, and 
appellant's arguments here fall well below 
that level. Appellant suggests that Justice 
Embry's general frustration with insurance 
companies reveals a disqualifying bias, but 
it is likely that many claimants have devel-
oped hostile feelings from the frustration 
in awaiting settlement of insurance claims. 
Insurers, on their side, have no easy task, 
especially when trying to evaluate whether 
certain medical diagnostic tests or pro-
longed hospitalization were indicated. In 
turn, the physicians and surgeons, whether 
impelled by valid medical judgment or by 
apprehension as to future malpractice 
claims—or some combination of the two— 
similarly face difficult problems. Appel-
lant's allegations of bias and prejudice on 
this general basis, however, are insufficient 
to establish any constitutional violation. 
B 
The record in this case presents more 
than mere allegations of bias and prejudice, 
however. Appellant also presses a claim 
that Justice Embry had a more direct stake 
in the outcome of this case. In Tumey, 
while recognizing that the Constitution 
does not reach every issue of judicial quali-
fication, the Court concluded that "it cer-
tainly violates the Fourteenth Amendment 
. . . to subject [a person's] liberty or proper-
ty to the judgment of a court the judge of 
which has a direct, personal, substantial, 
pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion 
against him in his case." 273 U.S., at 523, 
47 S.Ct, *t 441. 
More than 30 years ago Justice Black, 
speaking for the Court, reached a similar 
conclusion and recognized that under the 
Due Process Clause no judge "can be a 
judge in his own case [or be] permitted to 
try cases where he has. an interest in the 
outcome." In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 
136, 75 S.Ct 623, 625, 99 UEA 942 (1955). 
He went on to acknowledge that what de-
gree or kind of interest is sufficient to 
disqualify a judge from sitting "cannot be 
defined with precision." Ibid None-
theless, a reasonable formulation of the 
issue is whether the 
"situation is one 'which would offer a 
possible temptation to the average . . . 
judge to . . . lead him not to hold the 
balance nice, clear and true.'" Ward v. 
Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S., at 60, 
93 S.Ct, at 83. 
[4] Under these prior holdings, we ex-
amine just what factors might constitute 
such an interest in the outcome of this case 
that would bear on recusal. At the time 
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Justice Embry cast the deciding vote and 
authored the court's opinion, he had pend-
ing at least one very similar bad faith re-
fusal-to-pay lawsuit against Blue Cross in 
another Alabama court The decisions of 
the court on which Justice Embry sat,2 the 
Alabama Supreme Court, are binding on all 
Alabama courts. We need not blind our-
selves to the fact that the law in the area 
of bad faith refusal-to-pay claims in Ala-
bama, as in many other jurisdictions, was 
unsettled at that time, as the court's close 
division in deciding this case indicates. 
When Justice Embry cast the deciding 
vote, he did not merely apply well-estab-
lished law and in fact quite possibly made 
new law; the court's opinion does not sug-
gest that its conclusion was compelled by 
earlier decisions. Instead, to decide the 
case the court stated "it is first necessary 
to review the policy considerations, ele-
ments, and instructive guide posts set out 
by this court in earlier case law." 470 
So.2d, at 1070. And in another case the 
court acknowledged that "the tort of bad 
faith refusal to pay a valid insurance claim 
is in the embryonic stage, and the Court 
has not had occasion to address every issue 
that might arise in these cases/' National 
Savings Life Ins. Co. v. Button, 419 So.2d, 
at 1362. 
The decision under review firmly estab-
lished that punitive damages could be ob-
tained in Alabama in a situation where the 
insured's claim is not fully approved and 
only partial payment of the underlying 
claim had been made. Prior to the decision 
under review, the Alabama Supreme Court 
had not clearly recognized any claim for 
tortious injury in such circumstances; 
moreover, it had affirmatively recognized 
that partial payment was evidence of good 
faith on the part of the insurer. Sexton v. 
Liberty National Life Jra& Co., 405 So.2d 
18, 22 (1981). The Alabama court also held 
that a bad faith refusal-to-pay cause of 
action will lie in Alabama even where the 
insured is not entitled to a directed verdict 
on the underlying claim, a conclusion that 
at the least clarified the thrust of an earlier 
holding. Cf. National Savings Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Button, supra, at 1362. Final-
ly, the court refused to set aside as exces-
sive a punitive damages award of $3.5 mil-
lion. The largest punitive award previous-
ly affirmed by that court was $100,000, a 
figure remitted from $1.1 million as "obvi-
ously the result of passion and prejudice on 
the part of the jury." Gulf Atlantic Life 
Ins. Co. v. Barnes, 405 So.2d 916, 926 
(1981). 
All of these issues were present in Jus-
tice Embry's lawsuit against Blue Cross. 
His complaint sought recovery for partial 
payment of claims. Also the very nature 
of Justice Embry's suit placed in issue 
whether he would have to establish that he 
was entitled to a directed verdict on the 
underlying claims that he alleged Blue 
Cross refused to pay before gaining puni-
tive damages. Finally, the affirmance of 
the largest punitive damages award ever 
(by a substantial margin) on precisely the 
type of claim raised in the Blue Cross suit 
undoubtedly "raised the stakes" for Blue 
Cross in that suit, to the benefit of Justice 
Embry. Thus, Justice Embry's opinion for 
the Alabama Supreme Court had the clear 
and immediate effect of enhancing both the 
legal status and the settlement value of his 
own case. 
We need not decide whether to character-
ize the decision under review as a change 
in Alabama law or a clarification of the 
contours of that law, a judgment we are 
obviously not called on to make. We hold 
simply that when Justice Embry made that 
judgment, he acted as "a judge in his own 
case/' Murchison, supra, 349 U.S., at 136, 
75 S.Ct, at 625. 
We also hold that his interest was " 'di-
rect, personal, substantial, [and] pecuni-
ary/ " Ward, 409 U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at 
83 (quoting Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S., at 
523, 47 S.Ct, at 441). Justice Embry's 
complaint against Blue Cross sought "com-
pensatory damage for breach of contract, 
inconvenience, emotional and mental dis-
2. Justice Embry has since retired from the court for health reasons. 
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tress, disappointment, pain and suffering" 
in addition to punitive damages for himself 
and for the class. Soon after the opinion of 
the Alabama Supreme Court in this case 
was announced, Blue Cross paid Justice 
Embry what he characterized in an inter-
view as "a nice sum," Reply Brief for Ap-
pellant 10, n. 8, to settle the suit Records 
lodged with this Court show that Justice 
Embry received $30,000, which was depos-
ited by his attorney directly into Justice 
Embry's personal account To be sure, a 
portion of this money may have gone to 
Justice Embry's attorney in connection 
with the case, even though some materials 
before us suggest that his attorney agreed 
to waive his fee. Deposition of A. Grey Till 
in Clay v. Nationwide Insurance Co., CV-
78-1148 (Cir.Ct of Mobile Cty., Ala.), pp. 
27-29. We are also aware that Justice 
Embry obtained a statement in the settle-
ment agreement to the effect that "[t]he 
primary object of the institution of this suit 
. . . was to emphasize to defendant Blue 
Cross . . . that claims under the Plan be 
processed and determined by Blue Cross in 
a timely and efficient manner," even 
though that type of relief was not sought 
specifically in the complaint while mone-
tary relief was. We nonetheless hold that 
the "nice sum" that Justice Embry received 
directly is sufficient to establish the sub-
stantiality of his interest here. 
We conclude that Justice Embry's partic-
ipation in this case violated appellant's due 
process rights as explicated in Tumey, 
Murckison, and Ward. We make clear 
that we are not required to decide whether 
in fact Justice Embry was influenced, but 
3. The Court in Commonwealth Coatings Corp. v. 
Continental Casualty Co., 393 U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct. 
337, 21 LJEd.2d 301 (1963), stated in dicta that 
Min Tumey, 273 VS., at 524 [47 S.Ct.f at 4411, the 
Court held that a decision should be set aside 
where there is 'the slightest pecuniary interest' 
on the part of the judge... ." Id, 409 VS., at 
148, 89 S.Q., at 339. We think this was a 
misreading of Tumey. The reference to "the 
slightest pecuniary interest" in that opinion 
came in a portion of the opinion describing 
"cases at common law in England prior to the 
separation of colonies from the mother coun-
try....- 273 U.S., at 524. 47 S.CU at 441. At a 
only whether sitting on the case then be-
fore the Supreme Court of Alabama 
"would offer a possible temptation . . . to 
the average [judge] . . . [to] lead him to not 
to hold the balance nice, clear and true." 
Ward, supra, 409 U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at 
83. The Due Process Clause "may some-
times bar trial by judges who have no 
actual bias and who would do their very 
best to weigh the scales of justice equally 
between contending parties. But to per-
form its high function in the best way, 
'justice must satisfy the appearance of jus-
tice/" Murckison, 349 U.S., at 136, 75 
S.Ct, at 625 (citation omitted). 
C 
[5] Appellant has challenged not only 
the participation of Justice Embry in this 
case but also the participation of all the 
other justices of the Alabama Supreme 
Court, or at least the six justices who did 
not withdraw from Justice Embry's class 
action against Blue Cross, claiming that 
they also have an interest in' this case. 
Such allegations do not constitute a suffi-
cient basis for requiring recusal under the 
Constitution. In the first place, accepting 
appellant's expansive contentions might re-
quire the disqualification of every judge in 
the State. If so, it is possible that under a 
"rule of necessity" none of the judges or 
justices would be disqualified. See United 
States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 214, 101 S.Ct 
471, 480, 66 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). 
More important,* while these justices 
might conceivably have had a slight pecuni-
ary interest,3 we find it impossible to char-
later point in the opinion, Chief Justice Taft 
quoted approvingly from the work of Justice 
Cooiey, that disqualification is not worked in 
cases where the M "interest is so remote, trifling 
and insignificant that it may fairly be supposed 
to be incapable of affecting the judgment of or 
of influencing the conduct of an individual/" 
Id, at 533, 47 S.O., at 444 (quoting T Cooiey, 
Constitutional Limitations 594 (7th ed 1903)). 
Chief Justice Taft also reiterated that the case 
was not one "in which the penalties and the 
costs are negligible The court is a state 
agency, imposing substantial punishment.... 
It is not to be treated as a mere village tribunal 
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acterize that interest as " 'direct, personal, 
substantial, [and] pecuniary/ " Ward, su-
pra, 409 U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at 83 (quoting 
Tumey, supra, 273 U.S., at 523, 47 S.Ct, at 
441). Appellant concedes that nothing in 
the record even suggests that these jus-
tices had any knowledge of the class action 
before the court issued a decision on the 
merits. Thus, at most only the decision to 
deny rehearing was even plausibly affect-
ed. Any interest that they might have had 
when they passed on the rehearing motion 
was clearly highly speculative and contin-
gent At the time, the trial court had not 
even certified a class, let alone awarded 
any class relief of a pecuniary nature. 
With the proliferation of class actions in-
volving broadly defined classes, the appli-
cation of the constitutional requirement of 
disqualification must be carefully limited. 
Otherwise constitutional disqualification ar-
guments could quickly become a standard 
feature of class-action litigation. Cf. In re 
City of Houston, 745 F.2d 925 (CAS 1984). 
At some point, "[t]he biasing influence . . . 
[will be] too remote and insubstantial to 
violate the constitutional constraints." 
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 243, 
100 S.Ct 1610, 1614, 64 LEd.2d 182 (1980). 
Charges of disqualification should not be 
made lightly See Rooker v. Fidelity 
Trust Co., 263 UJS. 413, 44 S.Ct 149, 68 
LEd. 362 (1923). We hold that there is no 
for village peccadilloes." 273 VS., at 532, 47 
S.Ct., a* 444. We therefore follow Ward v. ViU 
lage of Monroevitte, 409 U.S. 57, 60, 93 S.Ct 80, 
83. 34 L.Ed2d 267 (1972), and decline to read 
Tumey as constitutionalizing any rule that a 
decision rendered by a judge with "the slightest 
pecuniary interest" constitutes a violation of the 
Due Process Clause. 
4. We have confined the opinion to the issues 
presented by the parties and express no view on 
the question discussed by the Justices who write 
separately. The issues here are far more com-
plex than acknowledged by the concurrences, 
which, reasoning from hypothetical situations 
on matters not presented by the facts of this 
case, postulate a broad general rule. Tradition-
ally the Court does not undertake to " 'formulate 
a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to which it is to be 
applied.'" Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Au-
basis for concluding these justices were 
disqualified under the Due Process Clause. 
D 
[6] Having concluded that only Justice 
Embry was disqualified from participation 
in this case, we turn to the issue of the 
proper remedy for this constitutional viola-
tion. Our prior decisions have not con-
sidered the question of whether a decision 
of a multimember tribunal must be vacated 
because of the participation of one member 
who had an interest in the outcome of the 
case. Rather, our prior cases have in-
volved interpretations of statutes with pro-
visions concerning this question, e.g., Com-
monwealth Corp. v. Casualty Co., 393 
U.S. 145, 89 S.Ct 337, 21 L.Ed.2d 301 
(1968), disqualifications of the sole member 
of a tribunal, e.g., Ward v. Village ofMon-
roeville, supra, and disqualifications of an 
entire panel, e.g., Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 
U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 
(1973). Some courts have concluded that a 
decision need not be vacated where a dis-
qualified judge's vote is mere surplusage. 
See, e.g., State ex reL Langer v. Kositzky, 
38 N.D. 616, 166 N.W. 534 (1918); but see, 
e.g., Oakley v. Aspinwall, 3 NT. 547 
(1850).4 But we are aware of no case, and 
none has been called to our attention, per-
mitting a court's decision to stand when a 
disqualified judge casts the deciding vote. 
Here Justice Emhry's vote was decisive in 
the 5-to-4 decision5 and he was the author 
thority, 297 VS. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct 466. 483. 80 
L.£d. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) 
(quoting Liverpool N. Y. <£ P.S.S. Co. v. Emigra-
tion Commissioners, 113 VS. 33, 39, 5 S.Ct. 352, 
355, 28 L.£d. 899 (1885)). Because the issue of 
disqualification of a single member of a multi-
member panel arises in a variety of factual 
contexts, see generally CJS. Judges § 159, p. 
868 (collecting cases), sound judicial practice 
wisely counsels judges to avoid unnecessary 
declarations on issues not presented, briefed, or 
argued. 
5* If Justice Embry had disqualified himself, the 
decision of the trial court would not have been 
affirmed by a vote of an equally divided court. 
Rather, AiaXode § 12-2-14 (1975). which au-
thorizes the appointment of special justices in 
the event disqualifications result in an even-
numbered court which is evenly divided on a 
matter, would presumably have come into play. 
AETNA LIFE INS, CO. v. LAVOIE 
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of the court's opinion. Because of Justice 
Embry's leading role in the decision under 
review, we conclude that the "appearance 
of justice" will best be served by vacating 
the decision and remanding for further pro-
ceedings. Appellees have not contended 
that, upon a finding of disqualification, this 
disposition is improper. 
Ill 
We underscore that our decision today 
undertakes to answer only the question of 
under what circumstances the Constitution 
requires disqualification. The Due Process 
Clause demarks only the outer boundaries 
of judicial disqualifications. Congress and 
the States, of course, remain free to impose 
more rigorous standards for judicial dis-
qualification than those we find mandated 
here today. 
Appellant also argues that the retrospec-
tive imposition of punitive damages under a 
new cause of action violates its rights un-
der the Contracts Clause of Article I, Sec-
tion 10; that a $3.5 million punitive damage 
award is impermissible under the Excessive 
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment; 
and that lack of sufficient standards gov-
erning punitive damage awards in Alabama 
violates the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment In addition, ap-
pellant contends that Ala.Code § 12-22-72 
(1975), under which any person who unsuc-
cessfully appeals a money judgment is as-
sessed 10% penalty, is unconstitutional un-
der the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment These arguments 
raise important issues which, in an appro-
priate setting, must be resolved; however, 
our disposition of the recusal-for-bias issue 
makes it unnecessary to reach them. 
The judgment of the Supreme Court of 
Alabama is vacated, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not incon-
sistent with this opinion. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Justice STEVENS took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
Justice BRENNAN, concurring. 
I agree with the Court that, given Justice 
Embry's interest in the outcome of this 
case, his participation in its disposition vio-
lated due process. As the Court notes, 
resolution of the issues raised in the appeal 
below enhanced the viability and settlement 
value of Justice Embry's own lawsuit. 
Such an interest clearly required recusal 
under our decisions in Tumey v. Ohio, 273 
U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927); 
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S.Ct. 
623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955); Ward v. Village 
of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 93 S.Ct. 80, 34 
L.Ed.2d 267 (1972); and Gibson v. Berry-
hill 411 U.S. 564, 93 S.Ct 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 
488 (1973). As Justice Black explained in 
In re Murchison, supra: 
"A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process. Fairness of 
course requires an absence of actual bias 
in the trial of cases. But our system of 
law has always endeavored to prevent 
even the probability of unfairness. To 
this end no man can be a judge in his 
own case and no man is permitted to try 
cases where he has an interest in the 
outcome." 349 U.S., at 136, 75 S.Ct, at 
625. 
I write separately to set forth my under-
standing of certain statements in the 
Court's opinion. First, the Court stresses 
that Justice Embry's interest was " 'direct, 
personal, substantial, [and] pecuniary/" 
Ante, at 1586 (quoting Ward, supra, 409 
U.S., at 60, 93 S.Ct, at 83); see also, ante, 
at 1588. I do not understand that by this 
language the Court states that only an 
interest that satisfies this test will taint the 
judge's participation as a due process viola-
tion. Nonpecuniary interests, for example, 
have been found to require recusal as a 
matter of due process. See, e.g., In re 
Murchison, supra (judge who presided 
over a "one-man grand jury" also presided 
over contempt proceedings relating to 
events which took place in the grand jury 
proceedings). Moreover, as this case dem-
onstrates, an interest is sufficiently "di-
rect" if the outcome of the challenged pro-
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ceeding substantially advances the judge's 
opportunity to attain some desired goal 
even if that goal is not actually attained in 
that proceeding. See, e.g.f Ward v. Village 
of Monroeville, supra (mayor's adjudica-
tion of traffic fines, which contributed to 
city finances, violated due process); Gibson 
v. Berryhill supra (proceedings by Ala-
bama Board of Optometry enjoined because 
Board members were competitors of peti-
tioners and therefore stood to gain competi-
tively). Nothing in the Court's opinion 
should be read, as I understand it, to limit 
these precedents in any way. Rather, the 
Court clearly indicates the contrary in ac-
knowledging that the interests which trig-
ger due process condemnation "cannot be 
defined with precision." Ante, at 1585 
(quoting In re Murckison, supra, 349 U.S., 
at 136, 75 S.Ct., at 625). 
Second, the Court points out that Justice 
Embry obtained a favorable settlement in 
his own lawsuit several months after the 
Alabama Supreme Court handed down its 
decision in this case. But even without 
that settlement, Justice Embry's partic-
ipation in this case deprived appellant of 
due process. The deprivation occurred 
when Justice Embry took part in the delib-
erations and decision of the Alabama Su-
preme Court in this case. At most—and, 
again, I do not read the Court's opinion to 
say otherwise—the fact of the later settle-
ment merely confirms that Justice Embry 
had a substantial interest in the outcome of 
this case. 
Finally, I understand that the Court's 
opinion is not to be read to suggest that the 
outcome might be different had Justice 
Embry not provided the necessary fifth 
vote in the court below. That fact too is 
irrelevant—Justice Embry's participation in 
the court's resolution of the case, while he 
was fully aware of his interest in its out-
come, was sufficient in itself to impugn the 
decision. The description of an opinion as 
being "for the court" connotes more than 
merely that the opinion has been joined by 
a majority of the participating judges. It 
reflects the fact that these judges have 
exchanged ideas and arguments in deciding 
the case. It reflects the collective process 
of deliberation which shapes the court's 
perceptions of which issues must be ad-
dressed and, more importantly, how they 
must be addressed., And, while the influ-
ence of any single participant in this pro-
cess can never be measured with precision, 
experience teaches us that each member's 
involvement plays a part in shaping the 
court's ultimate disposition. The partic-
ipation of a judge who has a substantial 
interest in the outcome of a case of which 
he knows at the time he participates neces-
sarily imports a bias into the deliberative 
process. This deprives litigants of the as-
surance of impartiality that is the funda-
mental requirement of due process. 
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice 
MARSHALL joins, concurring in the judg-
ment 
I join the Court's judgment that Justice 
Embry's participation in this case denied 
appellant the impartial decisionmaker re-
quired by the Due Process Clause. I write 
separately, however, to stress that the con-
stitutional violation in this case should not 
depend on the Court's apparent belief that 
Justice Embry cast the deciding vote—a 
factual assumption that may be incorrect 
and, to my mind, should be irrelevant to the 
Court's analysis. For me, Justice Embry's 
mere participation in the shared enterprise 
of appellate decisionmaking—whether or 
not he ultimately wrote, or even joined, the 
Alabama Supreme Court's opinion—posed 
an unacceptable danger of subtly distorting 
the decisionmaking process. 
The Court states that a decision cannot 
be permitted to stand "when a disqualified 
judge casts the deciding vote. Here, Jus-
tice Embry's vote was decisive in the five-
to-four decision and he was the author of 
the court's opinion." Ante, at 1588-1589. 
In a footnote, the Court elaborates on the 
decisiveness of Justice Embry's vote: had 
he disqualified himself, the decision of the 
trial court would not have been affirmed by 
an equally divided court because, under 
UNITED STATES v. AMERICAN COLLEGE OF PHYSICIANS 1591 
Cite aft 106 S.Ct. 1591 (1986) 
Alabama law, a special justice would have 
been appointed to break the tie. Ante, at 
1589, n. 5. 
The record, however, casts doubt upon 
the Court's suggestion that Justice Embry 
provided the most crucial vote. Justice 
Embry's deposition testimony in the Blue 
Cross suit suggests that the initial vote of 
the Alabama Supreme Court was in fact to 
reverse the decision of the trial court in 
favor of the Lavoies. Accordingly, Justice 
Embry began work on a dissent App. to 
Juris. Statement 168a-169a. After Justice 
Embry began writing, however, at least 
one justice switched his vote. Justice Em-
bry's proposed dissent ultimately was is-
sued as the per curiam opinion of the 
court. He explained: "It's customary a lot 
of times [to issue an opinion as a per 
curiam ], if it's been assigned to you be-
cause the other opinion didn't prevail " 
Id., at 167a. 
We cannot know what led each justice on 
the Alabama Supreme Court to the position 
he or she reached in this case. But we do 
know, from our own experience on this 
9-member Court, that a forceful dissent 
may lead Justices to rethink their original 
positions and change their votes. And to 
suggest that the author of an opinion 
where the final vote is 5-4 somehow plays 
a peculiarly decisive "leading role," ante, 
at 1589, ignores the possibility of a case 
where the author's powers of persuasion 
produce an even larger margin of votes. It 
makes little sense to intimate that if Jus* 
tice Embry's dissent had led two colleagues 
to switch their votes, and the final vote had 
been 6-3, Aetna would somehow not have 
been injured by his participation. 
More importantly, even if Justice Embry 
had not written the court's opinion, his 
participation in the case would have violat-
ed the Due Process Clause. Our experi-
ence should tell us that the concessions 
extracted as the price of joining an opinion 
may influence its shape as decisively as the 
sentiments of its nominal author. To dis-
cern a constitutionally significant differ-
ence between the author of an opinion and 
the other judges who participated in a case 
ignores the possibility that the collegial 
decisionmaking process that is the hall-
mark of multimember courts led the author 
to alter the tone and actual holding of the 
opinion to reach a majority, or to attain 
unanimity. And because this collegial ex-
change of ideas occurs in private, a review-
ing court may never discover the actual 
effect a biased judge had on the outcome of 
a particular case. We should not attempt 
the perhaps futile task of distilling Justice 
Embry's particular contribution to deter-
mine whether the result would have been 
the same had he disqualified himself at the 
outset. I would not want other appellate 
courts to read the Court's opinion today to 
suggest that such an inquiry provides an 
appropriate guarantee of due process. 
The violation of the Due Process Clause 
occurred when Justice Embry sat on this 
case, for it was then the danger arose that 
his vote and his views, potentially tainted 
by his interest in the pending Blue Cross 
suit, would influence the votes and views 
of his colleagues. The remaining events— 
that another justice switched his vote and 
that Justice Embry wrote the court's opin-
ion—illustrate, but do not create, the con-
stitutional infirmity that requires us to va-
cate the judgment of the Alabama Supreme 
Court 
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